

# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

*A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy*

JANUARY 1942



STUDENT AT THE CROSSROADS

*Christian L. Bonnet*

PROVINCE OF RHETORIC AND POETIC

*Walter J. Ong*

EDUCATION FOR PROGRESS

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CAUSALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

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NOTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY IN SUAREZ

*William N. Clarke*

*Editorial*

*Book Reviews*

# THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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## What Other Men Have Thought

*An Editorial*

EVERYTHING from a house of cards to the latest cyclotron is easier to tear apart than to put together. And only too often the destruction is far more brilliant than the construction. Ever since man has been expressing himself (and that has been from the beginning), the destructive critic has had a far easier task than either the constructive critic or the victim whose contribution is demolished with such devastating wit and satire. No one better than the critic himself recognizes this fact—though he may not be the first to admit it. The greatest writers have indulged in it, and it must be confessed that it has not always been without fruit. As a matter of fact, a certain amount of negative criticism is necessary. We can go back, if we wish, to Aristotle and we shall see this principle admirably illustrated. Nowhere is the Stagirite more brilliant than in those passages where he turns his keen, critical intellect to the destruction of his predecessors' opinions. Had he nothing else to offer, he could have won a name for himself by his skill in demolishing untenable positions.

### *Allurement of the Negative*

Down through history great and small have followed the "Philosopher" along this negative line. But those who came after did not always have Aristotle's qualifications for the post of devil's advocate. In the majority of cases, their positive contribution has been too negligible to warrant their negative superabundance. Great and small have followed the example of Aristotle, but only the truly great have been able to rise above the allurements of the brilliant negative and cling to the less attractive and far more difficult positive. Saint Thomas Aquinas was one of these very great—and he stands out in history all the more for this very quality. And, if we may be permitted to make a comparison, Professor Gilson, in modern times, is one of the great who has been able to rise above the same allurements for which his brilliant intellect truly qualifies him. To this, perhaps (among other things), may be ascribed his extraordinary contributions to philosophy in our own day.

Of course, there is no denying that it is difficult to be positive, especially when we are trying to evaluate the work of men whose conclusions we are forced to reject. Comparisons are always odious; and once we have looked at the magnificent synthesis achieved by Saint Thomas, we are naturally inclined to think disparagingly of the faltering steps of even the greatest among other philosophers. And yet, it is not exactly fair to condemn anyone in the history of thought for not attaining to the height which only one man reached. It is an even worse injustice to take this attitude toward those who were unable to profit by the clear light of his teaching. Now it may seem a bit unfair on our own part,

and to smack of the same negative attitude against which we are inveighing, to say that such an attitude flows only too often from a kind of laziness which keeps men from looking into the thought of those who have been conveniently refuted by others. How often do we not see Saint Anselm, Saint Albert, Scotus, Suarez rejected with a scornful snap of the fingers because better minds than our own have examined into their principles and have found them wanting! At least these better minds have profited where we have not; from looking into the works of men who were great even when they were wrong—and whose contribution has not always been so negligible as our self-satisfaction would have us imagine.

### *A Difficult Task*

Allowing all this, however, there is no sense in minimizing the task that such criticism involves—it is enormous! To give to each thinker the tribute of really examining into his position before discarding it, is a task requiring in him who would undertake it many virtues besides that of the mental acumen without which not even a beginning is possible. It requires, first of all, a great deal of humility—intellectual humility, the willingness to learn even when we think that a man has nothing to teach us. This barrier halts many a victim who starts out with all the enthusiasm in the world, but next to no good sense.

Beyond this there is demanded a willingness to do grinding and often discouraging work. It is the sort of work that does not loom large in the eyes of the many, nor is it such as to gratify the appetite for getting ahead rapidly. The task we have outlined requires, too, a keen historical sense. And here we come to an obstacle that no amount of goodwill, humility, or even hard work can supply for. There is much of genius in this and it is granted to the rare few. Again we might cite Professor Gilson as a shining example. With this will have to be joined a high degree of patience—and we all know how many founder on that rock! There are many other qualifications, but perhaps the picture is gloomy enough already. We might sum it all up by saying that we are going to make no advances at all until we cease to consider the history of philosophy as a record of human pathology. We are going to stand in one spot until we realize that not only the achievements of the very great but even the failures of the less great can aid us in our quest for truth.

If those who set themselves up as critics of their predecessors (great and small) had these qualifications there would be less likelihood of injustice being done to any thinker, and more likelihood that we shall be truly able to take up where others have left off, instead of tearing down before attempting to build.



# The Student at the Crossroads

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THE study of philosophy should offer to man the most satisfying of human experiences as the mind progresses step by step in the understanding of Truth, with each newly grasped detail bathing the whole of reality in a greater intensity of intelligible light in the steady advance toward what can never be more than a human approximation of the infinite understanding of God. There should be a growing satisfaction, a growing certainty as the Truth becomes possessed by the mind in greater and greater degree. Yet, it too often happens that the beginner in Philosophy, and perhaps not he alone, finds himself afflicted with a very troublesome "malaise," especially at the beginning of his philosophical studies. A disquieting doubt keeps raising its head to destroy his sense of satisfaction in the possession of the Truth. A haunting question persists in the mind and will not be dislodged. Just what is the foundation of what is being learned? Is the foundation solid? Is philosophical certainty really established?

## *False Problem*

As philosophical knowledge is deepened and completed it becomes evident that this attitude of mind is pathological and that the problem or question of whether the mind can know truth is not a genuine one, applying as it does to the problem of truth principles that are not its own. Undoubtedly a sincere application and growing appreciation of the metaphysics of the True and of the entire Thomistic synthesis should develop in time a realization of the absurdity of the problem as stated; but the process is sometimes all too long drawn out, and until the realization comes there remains that fear of a lack of proper foundation which acts as a brake on the student's best philosophical efforts. Indeed, the disease is aggravated by the brilliant but misdirected and necessarily abortive efforts of some modern scholastic writers who waste precious talent knocking at a painted door in their attempts to give a direct answer to a question which is only a pseudo-question and in reality one without meaning.

It would be ridiculously easy to let the whole matter rest here, to declare that the philosophically competent mind is of rare occurrence, to say that one is sincerely troubled by this seeming difficulty simply has no capacity for philosophical development. Speaking objectively this might be correct. Truth is one and where there is truth, anything at variance with it is necessarily false. Yet, only the comparatively rare and gifted mind rests immediately satisfied that all else is false once he grasps the truth, especially in the higher fields of thought. The untrained mind especially has a strong tendency to test for falsity as well as for truth and does not rest satisfied until it has experienced and seen that what is presented to it as a possibility is false. The obstacle to certainty is not objective but subjective, and as such it presents a real problem.

Before we begin to philosophize we must first establish the fact that we have the ability to know. We must first know that we do know. This is the problem in its baldest expression. Let it not be forgotten that this "question" was really introduced by Descartes. Previous to his time, with the possible exception of a few scattered individuals, phi-

losophers were concerned with a question quite different—under what conditions can we be sure that our knowledge is firmly established? Knowledge was taken as a fact; the whole question was to "check" its validity in individual cases. With Descartes the question is pushed back: Is knowledge possible?

Must that pseudo-problem remain as a ball-and-chain hampering the progress of the sincere beginner in the search for Wisdom from which he can be freed only after a comparatively long process of development, or is it possible at the very outset of philosophical study to unmask the impostor for what he is? Must there be a "Critica" (in the true sense), and, if not, is the only other alternative a sort of negative shelving of the whole question of scepticism and idealism in "Epistemology"? Can we only hope that the troublesome question, "Do we know that we know," or simply, "Do we know," will ultimately be dissolved in "the light of the greater truth"?

## *Common Sense: a Real Foundation?*

Just what is philosophy to the beginner? It appears as an inquiry into the fundamental causes of the ordinary things of experience which we daily take for granted in action. What may be called certainties of common sense or vulgar certainties are to be given a firmer foundation—if such a thing is possible—or proved to be mere appearances and illusion. Every man is convinced of many facts that affect himself and the world; he acts upon these facts with little consideration of their ultimate character. But now the question arises: must we take these things merely as they appear to be to common sense or can we establish them on an undeniable philosophical foundation? Whatever the answer may be, life will go on doing business as usual. Even the wildest sceptic or idealist dodges the brick aimed at his head!

The beginner, then, has a certainty to start with, a certainty on a lower level, the "vulgar," which on that level is a reality and will remain such for practical action. His question is whether this certainty on a lower level has equal validity on the higher philosophical level and whether from that higher level he can get a fuller knowledge of what he already knows in an ordinary way.

## *Which Road?*

A homely example may help to an understanding of the process we are suggesting as a remedy for the subjective difficulty concerning the certainty of philosophical knowledge. I have a knowledge of a certain city A, either from actual experience or from credible information. Finding myself in city B, I wish to go to city A. Is there a road from B to A? Of a number of possible roads leading out of B, which one leads to A? Does any of them do so? I don't know. Nor will I know from actual experience *until I actually follow the road* and find out that it does or does not lead to A. Of course, I may take someone's word for it, but I want to see for myself; I want to be sure in that sense. And I want to be certain before I set out! Now the absurdity is patent. I am very like the small boy who wants to know how to swim before he ever goes into the water. What to do? Try a



likely road. It comes to an end a few miles from B. One possibility *eliminated*. I see that this is not the road to A. One by one I try the possible roads till one proves the true one or till all are eliminated. Then, by actual experience, I know that this road is the right one or that there is no road from B to A. There is no question of the eliminated roads leading to my destination. I *know* that they do not because I *know* that they *do* lead elsewhere.

The beginner in philosophy is searching for the right road to philosophical validation of his ordinary certainties. If he engages himself more or less blindly on one or other road, he is troubled all along the way with the psychological fear that he may be on the wrong road, that there may be a better road, that there may be several roads to his goal. Granted that his mentors have started him on the right road, a time will come when he will see that it is the right one, but the disquiet may continue for long, and, if he does not go far enough, may never be dissolved. However, if the beginner is made to see that certain roads cannot and do not lead to the goal and that only one is left as a possibility, he can engage himself on that road with full assurance, knowing that his quest will result in certainty either that this road does lead to his goal, or that there is no way of reaching it. Such a process, though it does take time, is not time lost, for it does away with our pseudo-problem and releases the full energy of the beginner.

#### *Three Possibilities*

In the beginning of philosophy only three roads present themselves as possibilities. The first is to accept certain data on faith or authority and go on from there. The second is to give up the whole question and remain in a state of doubt. The third is to attempt a legitimization of those "vulgar" certainties, a checking of them with all the means at our disposal.

Should we begin with the third road as at first sight most satisfactory, there would still remain in the back of the mind that haunting thought—perhaps one of the other ways is the right one. All along the way we fear that our choice may have been mistaken. As a matter of fact, the other two roads do not lead us where we wish to go, but we are not sure of that. It is better, then, in the beginning to follow these other roads to their ends and thus eliminate them once and for all. The road of acceptance on faith or authority, the road of Fideism when followed quickly runs into the dead end of the denial of the very thing sought for, actually *seeing for oneself* the fundamental principles back of vulgar certainties. The road of doubt and scepticism ends abruptly in a blank wall of nothingness and complete contradiction. Only the third road remains *as a possibility*. Whether or not it will lead to our goal can be ascertained *only by following it*. Then and only then will we know that the road to our goal exists, or that there is no such road. At any rate, as we follow it, we will have no teasing doubt whether there is some other possible route. The other two roads have not been ruled out arbitrarily; they are *known* to be wrong.

It is important to place emphasis on the fact that in philosophy the only way to *know* that our chosen way is the right one is to *follow* it. The statement that philosophy is really understood only after the entire field has been covered is a trite one, but the statement is too often made without any real understanding of its important implications. In this light the false character of the problem first mentioned begins to appear. Just as we cannot *know* that a road leads to a certain place until we have actually followed it, so we cannot

*know that we know except in the knowing*. Our problem amounts to seeking something that is previous to the first and is a contradiction, an unintelligible. There is an affinity to Archimedes' somewhat whimsical offer to move the solid universe from its place provided he were given a solid point of support *outside of all that is solid*. In the same way our question suggests the necessity of establishing the validity of our knowledge by knowing something *before we know anything*. It is an attempt to travel a road without travelling it.

#### *Process of Elimination*

No sooner have we decided to attempt a legitimization of our vulgar certainties (not knowing as yet whether such an attempt can be successful) than we find our road branching off in three directions. Shall our investigation start from God, or from our minds, or from things? These are the three possible lines of investigation. Once again, we might choose more or less arbitrarily. Then, there might remain the possibility of having chosen the wrong road. Better to eliminate as we did before. Can we start from God? Hardly. This is only a semblance, a mere cut-off to a way already eliminated, that of Fideism; for God is not known to us immediately. There is no rock-bottom foundation for our knowledge here. What of the mind? This way is a bit longer, and many have travelled it—to get nowhere. Thing, or Being, is the only route left, and we can enter upon it with quiet mind, knowing with certainty that this road will either lead us to our goal or show us that there is no road to that goal, because we know that the other roads do not and cannot give us what we seek.

This clearing of the field would seem to be an answer to the query whether our original "malaise" is a necessary evil, to be cured only by a long process. This approach at the very beginning of philosophical inquiry satisfies the mind that the condition spoken of is a disease, a mistake, a contradiction. From this point on the positive metaphysics of the True unfolds itself, the certainty of the "road" increases as progress is made and the philosophical mind enjoys the keen satisfaction that comes from an ever deepening understanding of Truth.

Of course, what precedes is no more than an outline. The wrong approaches cannot be eliminated quite as easily as this. Each has to be considered first of all historically, i. e., this or that philosopher actually followed this path; his results were these. . . . A complete study would call for a full consideration of each and every erroneous system thus attempted. However, such a complete development of the history of error does not seem to impose itself. The historical development of a thought involves far more than itself. It involves a necessary series of causes in philosophical thought, so that from one outstanding attempt along a wrong line it is usually easy enough to indicate the inevitable terminal of any other attempt that steps out along the same path. Considering the matter in this way it is possible to point out the elements of contradiction or unintelligibility which vitiate the entire attempt and will necessarily vitiate all similar attempts, with the result that the mind rests satisfied that in this particular approach there can never be found a satisfactory solution. The bothersome "perhaps" is removed from the picture and the student can give his whole attention to the (as he now sees it) only possible way which may lead to the answer for his searching mind.

#### *Pseudo Problem Settled*

It is true that to the experienced philosopher, and even to what might be called the naturally right thinker, the



problem mentioned is no problem at all, and, as we have suggested, that is just what it is in itself. Many would take the whole thing as "growing pains" that will pass as the student learns more of the Truth. Nevertheless there seems to be a real problem here, subjectively, a real obstacle to the progress of the beginner, a difficulty that will prevent him from giving himself wholeheartedly to the study of Wisdom. Essentially the difficulty lies in a too frequently encountered misunderstanding of the purpose and method of Philosophy. The problem is not one of philosophy, or even of a philosopher, but of one who is or wishes to be a philosopher. It is a consideration of the philosophical starting point as if philosophy were the same as, say, science or

theology. It involves the contradiction of doing something without doing it and of finding something previous to what is first. If the true character of philosophy is made clear at the outset and if the fact is emphasized throughout the course that the proof of philosophical thought is found in its very working out, if the entire problem of human philosophical knowledge thus adumbrated in the beginning of the course is kept in mind throughout, treated from a different point of view in Psychology and "clinched" in the treatise on Natural Theology, there will perhaps be an effective antidote to the writings of certain modern neo-scholastics and neo-thomists who are far more *neo* than they are either scholastic or Thomist.

## The Province of Rhetoric and Poetic

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THE literature of all ages is inextricably wound up with rhetorical and poetical theory. This is true even of a time like the present, when rhetorical theory often proceeds by a kind of negation of formal rhetoric. The conscious avoidance of certain devices not only is impossible without the substitution of others, but is itself based on a theory. We can avoid certain techniques, but not technique. Though we may have cultivated a horror of naming our tools, which earlier artists did not know, we still retain some knowledge of how to use them. Hence rhetoric and poetic remain with us.

But rhetorical and poetical theory has most often failed to find the location of the boundaries within which each of these two arts operate. Current studies in literary history have not placed the lines of demarcation any more accurately.<sup>1</sup> Although the literary historian's distinctions between rhetoric and poetic have been more or less sufficient for his immediate purposes, there is still need to settle more definitely how a poetical work differs from a rhetorical one. The investigation of this question falls rather to the lot of the philosopher than to that of the literary historian, and hence the present discussion will be properly philosophical.

### I

Those things in the world which are made by man, being artifacts and not as such possessed of any substantial forms of their own, are differentiated from one another in a variety of ways: in terms of a variety of accidents which they possess, as when I speak of square artifacts, or black artifacts; in terms of the material, that is to say, the second matter in which they have their being, as when I speak of works of stone or works of iron; and finally in terms of their final causality—and this is the way in which we most gen-

erally speak of them—as when I speak of a table or of a gun or of a fountain pen.

Differentiation of the works of man in terms of final causality will proceed according to the more or less perfect participation of these works in this principle.<sup>2</sup> Thus we have the division into works of non-servile or fine arts and works of servile arts. The former are more perfect in the order of final causality in that they are ordered directly to the speculative intellect, to man's enjoyment as things of beauty, and are therefore destined only indirectly for other use, although their contemplation is of course governed by prudence.

Over against these works of fine arts, we have the works of those arts such as the machinist's or the paint manufacturer's art, which works are not directly for contemplation but means to further ends.

### *Rhetoric Ordered to Action*

Within this division of works of art in terms of final causality the division between works of rhetoric and works of poetic falls.<sup>3</sup> For, if we take rhetoric to signify what Aristotle took it to signify—"the ability to find the available means of persuasion with reference to any subject whatsoever"<sup>4</sup>—works of rhetoric must be ordered to the production of action in another individual and to action in the sense of something other than contemplation. Works of rhetoric have their finality, then, only in terms of that action to which they are ultimately directed. There is another art, which we call poetic, which produces works ordered to contemplation and to no other direct end, that is, works of beauty. Such works are produced simply to be enjoyed by the one contemplating them.

It is to be noted that this rhetoric and this poetic are logical arts directive of the acts of the intellect itself. It is true that there is what we may call a general poetic, an inclusive order of those arts directed to the production of

<sup>1</sup> Among the studies of rhetoric and poetic should be mentioned Charles Sears Baldwin's *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928), and *Renaissance Literary Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), as well as Donald Lemen Clark's *Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1922). A bibliography which includes works on rhetoric and poetic is given by William G. Crane, *Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), pp. 253-76. There are also bibliographies in Baldwin.

<sup>2</sup> Final causality, form, accident, etc., are of course to be taken analogously when referring to artifacts.

<sup>3</sup> There is no need to quibble over words. Rhetoric has some unpleasant meanings that interfere, but the meaning which is here attached to rhetoric is a traditional and accepted one. All that is asked is that the reader look to what is meant here by rhetoric—call it what he will.

<sup>4</sup> *Rhetoric* i. 2. 1. 1355b.



works for contemplation, which has a kind of unity derived from the community of end realized in such works. This order of arts, or general poetic, breaks down into poetic in the ordinary sense, sculpture, music, painting, and so on.

To this general poetic there corresponds another order of arts which we may call a general rhetoric and which includes those arts which may produce action in others not only by intellectual persuasion but by means other than the significative use of words. The sales agent who installs fluorescent lighting to put his customers at ease and thus indirectly persuade them to buy an automobile is practicing this general rhetoric.

However, the rhetoric and poetic which govern the formal use of words (as significative sounds) are both individual arts. They are logical arts, for each is not only a *habitus* of the intellect (all arts are this) but a *habitus* directive of the operations of the intellect itself. And yet they are not of the same species of logic as that according to which science (*scientia*) proceeds; for the connections in the logic of rhetoric and of poetic are not the necessary connections which exist in the logic of demonstration.

It will help to schematize a text from St. Thomas<sup>5</sup> (Fig. 1). Schematization of St. Thomas Aquinas in *I Anal. Post.*, Lect. 1.

Figure 1

*Ars logica* directs the acts of the intellect itself (*actus rationis*).  
*Ars logica* is diversified as are *actus rationis*:

I. *Intelligentia indivisibilium*

II. *Compositio vel divisio*

III. *Discursus*

Treated by Aristotle in:  
*Praedicamenta* (*Categoriae*)  
*Perihermenias*  
 Other logical treatises  
 as follows:

Art, like nature, acts in three ways, and the third act of the intellect has therefore a three-fold diversity, with corresponding arts:

A. *De necessitate* *ars logica judicativa*  
 (*cum certitudine*)

*ex forma syllogismi*:  
*Analytica Priora*  
*cum forma ex materia*  
*syllogismi: Analytica Posteriora*

B. *Frequentius* *ars logica inventiva*

1. *In pluribus*

a. *Cum probabilitate* *dialectica* *Topica (Dialectica)*  
 b. *Cum suspicione* *rhetorica* *Rhetorica*  
 c. *Cum existimatione* *poetica* *Poetica*

2. *In paucioribus* *sophistica* *De Sophisticis Elenchis*

In the diagram<sup>6</sup> the connection between the members of the syllogism in *logica judicativa* (or *demonstrativa*) is a necessary one. As we proceed downwards, the connections are seen to become progressively looser. In dialectic (disputation) they require probability. The rhetorical syllogism, or "enthymeme," requires only suspicion—for this degree of certitude is sufficient to induce a man to act. In poetic, the logical connection is merely feigned, for the poet is *making* his connection. Certain and probable connections—more probably ("cum probabilitate") or less probable ("cum suspicione")—exist independently of the poet and hence are not his to make. The sophistical argument, of course, does not really conclude and resists conclusion, so that it is lower on the scale than even the merely assumed argument of poetic.

<sup>5</sup> In *I Anal. Post.*, lect. 1.

<sup>6</sup> There are many points of difference among these arts which a scheme such as the one given here does not bring out. See, for example, Averroes In *Libros Rhetoricorum Aristotelis Paraphrasis*, lib. 1, praef. (ed. Venetiis: apud Iuntas, 1574, p. 65a): "Ars quidam Rhetoricae affinis est artis Topicae: quoniam ambae unum finem intendunt, qui est eloqui cum alio. et quo neutra istarum artium homo secum ipse utitur, sicut est Dispositio artis Demonstrationis: sed utitur eis cum alio."

Rhetoric, then, and poetic both differ from the logic of the sciences in that neither requires certitude for its arguments.<sup>7</sup> Rhetoric must more closely approximate certitude in its conclusions. Poetic contents itself with a logic that is very thin: its argumentation is treated as though it concluded, and this assumption suffices. Furthermore, although rhetoric and poetic are distinct arts directive of the third operation of the intellect, no given work is the product of such an art alone. The works of these arts, as they stand concreted in matter, are erected by other arts as well, arts which are directive of the physical structure out of which such things are made, as, for instance, an art which directs the rhythmical use of words, and so on. It is the aggregate of all these arts necessary for the production of a work of rhetoric or poetic which is often meant by "rhetoric" or "poetic," and it is such an aggregate that we have called a "general rhetoric" or a "general poetic." A book professing to teach rhetoric may, then, treat of many things other than the enthymeme and the example, and thus present a composite of several arts. Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, for instance, is a composite of this nature.<sup>8</sup>

## II

An important phenomenon in literary history is the persistent confusion of poetic with rhetoric or with demonstrative logic.<sup>9</sup> Poetic and rhetoric are confused when, in an attempt to strengthen its logic, poetic is made to proceed by means of the rhetorical enthymeme and example. Such an attempt can only result in something neither fish nor flesh—a poetic whose works are ordered to the practical intellect. Nevertheless, this sort of monster can be fathered on every age since Plato's. It comes into being when poetry is taken to be a direct means of persuasion, either because the defense of an art which creates objects simply for contemplation is felt to be impossible, or because the common association of certain other arts with both poetic and rhetoric obscures the true position of these latter arts. Since the works of both poetic and rhetoric are concreted in matter which is words, these arts gather around themselves a system of satellitic arts which are often the same for both rhetoric and poetic, arts such as that which governs the production of oral sounds. The fact that these arts are found in connection with both rhetoric and poetic tends to obscure the fact that in each case they are serving a different purpose.

### Judicative Logic and Poetic

The confusion which constantly tends to arise between poetic and the logic of demonstration which governs the sciences (including philosophy) is likewise of some importance. Clearly distinct from a work of rhetoric, a philosophical work, which proceeds according to *logica judicativa* and may be taken as typical of all scientific works, is not so easily distinguished from a poetical work. A philosophical treatise, like a poetical work, is directed to the speculative intellect. But in what way? The philosophical is concerned with the communication of something which has its existence independ-

<sup>7</sup> Historical works occupy a special place by the side of science. History is not science, though it constantly approaches science, as a calculus to its term.

<sup>8</sup> See, for instance, his treatment of gesture, xi. 3. 65 ff. Quintilian, who was a rhetorician without being a philosopher, defines rhetoric as "bene dicendi scientia." *Op. cit.* ii. 15. 34: "Huic eius substantiae maxime conveniet finitio, rhetoricum esse bene dicendi scientiam." Cf. *ibid.* ii. 15. 38. Not only is Quintilian's rhetoric a composite of many arts, but his "ars" and "scientia" are other things than St. Thomas'.

<sup>9</sup> Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic*, pp. 100, 229; *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic*, pp. ix, 24, 39, etc. (see General Index under "poetic merged with rhetoric"). Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-37.



ently of the words used to communicate it, and, while the poetic use of language communicates truth too, it is truth which does not exist in its totality as entirely independent of the language in which it is conveyed. The logical connections are made by the poet. They are fabricated ("cum existimatione"). Consequently, since they do not exist of themselves necessarily, assent to the argument of a poem must be induced by something other than the truths with which the poet deals, so that these truths are apprehended by the intellect with some special kind of cooperation on the part of the senses and emotions that is dependent on the very words in which the truths are presented. Insofar as a work acts independently of the words in which it is presented, it tends toward the scientific treatise.<sup>10</sup>

Now, in the confusion of poetic with rhetoric and with demonstrative logic, it is always poetic which tends to disappear. And the reason for this is not far to seek. The principal domestic struggle of Western culture has been between a philosophically centered and a rhetorically centered regimen. The forces engaged have been the champions of the speculative intellect versus the champions of the practical intellect. On this basis was waged the struggle between Socrates and the sophists, the struggle which led to John of Salisbury's *Metalogicus*, and the struggle which was echoed in Swift's *The Battle of the Books*. The victory has gone first to one side and then to another. Under the Roman Empire and until the eleventh century the rhetoricians were in the ascendancy, but by the thirteenth century philosophy seemed destined to win out, only to receive a sharp setback when rhetoric triumphed and made the Renaissance.<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile poetic has had to eke out an existence in occupied territory. Philosophy is eminently speculative. It will do no work. Rhetoric is eminently practical. It will do a work which is itself productive of some work on the part of others. Poetic is practical, but its work is not. It runs shortly to a dead end. Its work is for the speculative intellect here and now, ordered further only indirectly by reason of prudence. Hence, tucked away in its tight little corner, poetical composition has never been accorded the prominence in any curriculum that either rhetoric or philosophy have, and even when rhetoric has fallen on evil days, as it had in the thirteenth century and as it more or less has now, it is still in a position to bestow largess on poetic, which, as an art, is consistently neglected in schools.

#### *Poetry's Results—Indirect*

The defense of poetry depends not on what its works do

<sup>10</sup> Gerard Manley Hopkins, S.J., a poet highly conscious of technique, had an artist's characteristic awareness of this special mode of operation in poetry:

"Poetry is speech framed for contemplation of the mind by way of hearing or speech framed to be heard for its own sake and interest even over and above its interest of meaning. Some matter and meaning is essential to it but only as an element necessary to support and employ the shape which is contemplated for its own sake." *The Note-Books and Papers of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, ed. by Humphrey House (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 249.

It should be noted, however, that what the poet makes is not independent of the truths he makes it of. The truths he employs are not the poetry, and he can use great truths to make poor poetry indeed, but he cannot make great poetry without great truths. Neither stone nor straw is of my making; nevertheless, although I can badly botch a piece of stone construction I attempt, a better house can be made of stone than of straw. For all this, the poet can utilize any material, for he is not making houses but simply things: his art is in a way coextensive with being.

<sup>11</sup> For a thorough and enlightening treatment of the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric that runs through the history of Western civilization, I am particularly indebted to some unpublished work of

directly, but on what they do indirectly. Because so many well-meaning but unobserving persons insist on defending it for the direct results it produces—a line of defense which is untenable—neglecting the entirely valid argument that the organization which a schooled appreciation of poetry imposes upon the human being is something that cannot be attained independently of words of poetic (or of music, painting, and so on), we are continually having the wrong thing defended or the right thing defended for the wrong reasons. This difficulty is, of course, chronic, and will remain so, for the indirect results which works of poetic bring about in the human being are known only to those who have had experience of them.

It will be seen, then, that the contrast between poetic and scientific writing is a more basic one than that between verse and prose. In the one case the difference arises from final causality, while in the other it is merely of accidental origin, dependent upon and ordered to the purpose which the work is to serve.<sup>12</sup> This should be a commonplace. It has been said over and over again from Aristotle's time<sup>13</sup> on, even by persons whose discussions are critical rather than philosophical, as, for instance, Coleridge.<sup>14</sup> But it represents a stand which is continually being challenged.

There is, of course, a connection between verse and poetry, as there is between prose and scientific writing. Scientific writing, as has already been said, is concerned with the communication of something which has its existence independently of the words used to communicate it. Hence any configuration of those words lies outside the realm of such writing. If a scientific work is written in verse, the configuration is truly an ornament added to the scientific content of the writing. In poetry, however, the verse functions as an intimate part of the work itself. Apart from what special significative force verse rhythms may themselves exert (as in rhythmic onomatopoeia), they constitute a part of the object to be contemplated. Their relation to the "logical" content is close in a work where the connections in such content are, like the verse itself, of the author's own making.

#### *Poetry in Prose*

But this is not to identify verse with poetry, for prose, too, may be written to produce a work for contemplation. Such a work would be poetry in the sense in which this word is used here. No more is it to identify verse with one particular kind of rhythmic patterning (as, for example, with the syllable-counting systems of Homer, Vergil, and most English poets after the Conquest, as against the antithetical patterning of Hebrew poetry or the stress patterning of Old English or modern "free" verse).

Rhetoric, falling between *logica judicativa* and poetic, favors a prose development, for the rhetorician, although he deals with that which is not necessary (or certain), is not the "maker" that the poet is. His logic is not as intimately connected as the poet's is with the words in which it is concentered.

It is seen, then, that poetic is distinguished from rhetoric by the relative tenuousness of its logical connections. The

Professor Étienne Gilson made available in a course of lectures delivered recently by Dr. Bernard J. Muller-Thym at St. Louis University. Cf. also Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), pp. 93-126.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Hopkins again, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-51. This short section, headed "Poetry and Verse," is in reality a chapter on poetic, and directly pertinent to the present discussion.

<sup>13</sup> *Poetics* i. 7-12. 1447b.

<sup>14</sup> See *Biographia Literaria*, ed. by J. Shawcross (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907), Ch. XIV (II, 5-13—esp. 10).



logic of poetic and of rhetoric follows the end to which each of these arts is directed—the former to the making of a thing for contemplation, the latter to the production of action in another. Both poetic and rhetoric are distinct from the logic of the sciences in that their arguments do not proceed with necessity, although rhetoric approximates the necessary in a way that poetic does not.

However, as a matter of fact, most writing is a composite, not only in the sense that arts other than those which govern the operations of the intellect are needed in order that a given concrete piece of writing take form, but also in the sense that a given piece of writing will often partake of the nature of many kinds of writing at once. In most of what

may be designated as poetry there is a considerable mixture of special pleading which is nothing more or less than dialectic or rhetoric. Again, what we would ordinarily call a poem may *de facto* convey scientific as well as poetic truth, although it is not as a poem that it does so. And a politician who should be practicing rhetoric may introduce a fact for its own sake. Finally, writing ostensibly scientific can and often does become a plea to take this attitude toward the subject, or that. Works of rhetoric, poetic, and science do not exist in the concrete in separate works. We must generally rest satisfied with calling a thing a poem because it is mostly a poem, or a political speech a work of rhetoric because it is nearer to that than it is to anything else.

## Education for Progress

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IN recent numbers of *Harpers*<sup>1</sup> have appeared two articles favoring the kind of culture for which Scholastics have long been contending. One detects in these articles an echo of the controversy a few years ago between President Hutchins and John Dewey,<sup>2</sup> yet the note of controversy is not now so pronounced. Certainly Hutchins still discounts Dewey's educational philosophy, as instanced by the racy comment: "We understood, if we thought about the matter at all, that American Philosophy held that whatever succeeded was O. K." (p. 513) And he later touches the core of the dispute between himself and Dewey: "Our most disturbing questions, moreover, are questions about ends. Science is about means." (*ibid.*)<sup>3</sup> Neither in the companion article does Professor Adler break a lance on the Dewey-minded, except by his opposition to their "nothing but" attitude. An unwary reader may be led to think that there is no basic difference between what Hutchins and Dewey are advocating.

### *Metaphysics and Religion*

In a way of speaking, they are *not* at odds in what they are aiming at; both want a better human life for the many. They are both *for* the same thing. The difference is in what Dewey is *against*. Dewey is against metaphysics and religion.<sup>4</sup> As a matter of fact, what Dewey represents as metaphysics is not really metaphysics at all, and what he takes to be religion is not really religion. The harm comes from his turning men's minds against all metaphysics and all religion, the genuine as well as the counterfeit. Nor is Dewey, despite his protestations, unconcerned about ends; his constant end is the betterment of human life. And though he limits his aim to the "deepening and broadening" of man's enjoyment of this passing life, surely that aim is not excluded by the philosophies he opposes. He declines to consider an after-

life, on the pragmatic ground that the belief in such life renders man indifferent to the social ills of the present; but he conveniently forgets that our future well being is conditioned on our working to eliminate human evils, both physical and moral, here and now. The "organism" (man), we are told, is to improve his environment (his neighbors) while they improve him. Except for terminology and scope, wherein does this differ from the Christian concept of the better life? The difference is in the means. Dewey relies on human "impulsions," without fixed code or principles, and a trial-and-error method to discover what yields the desired results. Hutchins, practical man that he is, is sure that such a method can only mean continual experimenting *ab ovo*, and can lead to no other "growth" than that of increasing confusion and disorder in society. The means Dewey advocates will defeat the very end he aims at. Were it not better then to capitalize on the long experience of the human race, the cultural heritage, as a starting point for making modern adjustments?

Dewey's notion of metaphysics is that it is, or sponsors, some sort of entity alien to the realities of human experience, an "Absolute" that would force its iron will upon us humans by doing violence to our spontaneous aspirations. Perhaps the Emersonian Transcendentalism and Puritanical rigor that surrounded Dewey's boyhood gave him that notion, but one would think that he would eventually have outgrown it. In a similar way, religion is to him an emotional state which is out of all contact with science, logic and everyday experience—an entirely subjective and intolerant feeling that has no justification except the obstinacy with which certain people cling to it. He blames this obstinacy on institutions, customs, rites, codes. And this explains why, though Dewey is in favor of "religious" feelings, because they are enjoyable, he is opposed to "religions." He falls victim to the age-old canard that religion has been foisted on man by interested parties. And even the simplest metaphysics of the nature of man he would put in the same class.

There is a field here [he writes] that has hardly been entered by intellectual explorers:—the story of the way in which ideas put forth about the make-up of human nature, ideas supposed to be the result

<sup>1</sup> Robert Maynard Hutchins, "Education for Freedom," *Harpers*, no. 1097, Oct. 1941; Mortimer J. Adler, "The Chicago School," *ibid.*, no. 1096, Sept. 1941.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Social Frontier*, Dec. 1936, Jan., May, June, 1937; *MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, Jan., March, 1938.

<sup>3</sup> *Harpers*, Oct., 1941, p. 513.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. "Dewey's Esthetic Experience," *MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, Nov., 1937, p. 9; "The Man Whom Dewey Would Educate," *ibid.*, March, 1939, p. 60.



of psychological inquiry, have been in fact only reflections of practical measures that different groups, classes, factions wished to see continued in existence or newly adopted, so that what passed as psychology was a branch of political doctrine.<sup>5</sup>

### *Doctrine of Ends*

But aside from such "apocryphal history" of philosophy, to use Professor Cohen's phrase,<sup>6</sup> why does Dewey reject the "doctrine of ends" which his opponents are always demanding? That is not an easy question to answer, because Dewey himself is forever professing that his constant aim is the temporal prosperity and happiness ("enjoyment," I should have said) of societal man. True, it is not ends, it is *fixed* ends that he objects to. But is not the end just mentioned a fixed end? No, Dewey quibbles, because enjoyment is not something fixed, it is movement, change. Again, enjoyment cannot be an end, in the sense of a *terminus*; each enjoyment, to be such, must lead to *other* enjoyments; no enjoyment can be terminal. Yet, even here, Dewey makes an exception in favor of "consummatory values," which are enjoyed for their own sake without reference to any other. So these reasons appear inadequate. The basic reason is perhaps Dewey's fear that if human nature is assigned a fixed end, that nature will not only be fixed; it will be fixated. That would bring back the iron predeterminism of the "Absolute."

There was still a way out, and that was by conceding man a free will. But who was Dewey to concede anything so medieval? He would rather have "spontaneity." Yet his spontaneous impulsions are either totally predetermined or they are not. Whether the predetermination is of the "hard" or the "soft" variety makes no difference. If they are totally predetermined, then the fixation of reality and its course is final and complete. What surprises are in store for us are only surprises *to us*; there wasn't even a possibility of any event other than the one that occurred, and nature will forever continue on her foredoomed, inflexible course. Without free will there is no progress, no betterment possible. It would seem that Dewey is satisfied to "settle for" surprises. If there is no free will, then nature is set "once for all;" the cards are stacked, and I can only breathlessly wait to see what hands are dealt me.

Dewey could have saved much of his philosophy, and his élan, if he had outrightly admitted free will. His avoidance of that admission has put him in the uncomfortable position of holding a fixity where Christian philosophers admit a mobility. By saying that man has a definite and determinate nature, we do not mean that man is incapable of change; we mean that so long as he has intelligence and free will he is in a class by himself, and by that very fact can really progress. Dewey tries to escape from the trap he has set for himself by such effusions as the following:

The alleged unchangeableness of human nature cannot be admitted. For while certain needs in human nature are constant, the consequences they produce . . . react back into the original components of human nature to shape them into new forms. The total pattern is thereby modified.<sup>7</sup>

But if there is no free will, the needs are predetermined, the way they are gratified is predetermined, the consequences are predetermined, their reacting is predetermined, the modification is predetermined; there wasn't a thing anybody could

do about it but watch it happen. Dewey, in short, banished the Absolute from the empyrean, only to find it turn up in our own sweet human nature.

### *Relativism*

It is the concept of man that is basic in the controversy between Dewey and Hutchins. Dewey may speak of the influence of the past in producing present-day man as an "acculturated organism,"<sup>8</sup> but that does not, or should not, satisfy President Hutchins. Man is not a purely biological specimen. An organism transmits only physical characteristics. Man can transmit his experiences, and the reasoned conclusions from his experiences; and he does it by means of language. That is why Hutchins insists on proficiency in this medium of converse among minds of today, and between these and the minds of the past. Dewey, too, senses the importance of language as an "instrument," but the instrument so changes that any true communication with the past is lost and even a living language is nothing but "weasel words." Witness this revamping of the basic principle of American Democracy. Jefferson: "Nothing is unchangeable but the inherent and inalienable rights of man." Dewey: "Something deep and indestructible in the needs and demands of human-kind." "Rights," for Jefferson, become "something," for Dewey.<sup>9</sup>

That wishywashy "something" is a camouflage by which Dewey seeks to hide from metaphysics. But metaphysics is not, as Dewey supposes, alien to experience; it is, if it be genuine, built on experience. Abstractions are extractions; they extract the all-inclusive, rich and fruitful essence of the particulars of human experience. They are a summary and scientific seizure and expression of the vibrant content of experience; and they are worthless unless they can be fitted back into present and future experiences.

On the other hand, God is not, in any sense, an abstraction. If a spiritual soul, which Dewey is wary of, if free will, which he disavows, if an atom, which he cannot see yet admits—if these things are real beings apart from our thinking them, then God is the most real of all and the very antithesis of abstraction. So, too, religion is founded on and is a deduction from human experience and can be applied to human life to make it more fruitful of greater successes than Dewey dreams of in his Instrumentalism. Dewey contends that religion is "divisive"<sup>10</sup> of human society, but that is only because he regards religion as a purely emotional state divorced from reality. Not religion, but Dewey's own emphasis on emotional states as the summum bonum, threatens the disruption of society.

Finally, there is "indoctrination," to which the followers of Dewey were so opposed, but which many of them now believe in to the extent of "Indoctrination for Democracy." What is indoctrination? It is the instilling of a formula in the minds of others, *without affording them an opportunity of either testing the formula by experience or examining the grounds on which it is predicated*. Indoctrination is not, as the Deweyites imagine, the technique of the Church; it is that of the dictators. A good example of indoctrination is

<sup>8</sup> *Philosophy of John Dewey*, P. A. Schilpp, Ed., Northwestern University Press, 1939, p. 530.

<sup>9</sup> *Freedom and Culture*, p. 156.

<sup>10</sup> At a recent hearing before the New York City Board of Education for the purpose of discussing "Released Time" for religious instruction, Dewey, at the age of 81, still maintained his life-long stand that religion is a major cause of "division and antagonism." Yet the world-wide division and antagonism which the dictators have forced on the world today stem from the irreligious philosophy of Hegel, of which Deweyism is the self-styled "democratic" version.

<sup>5</sup> *Freedom and Culture*, Putnam, 1939, p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> Morris R. Cohen, "Some Difficulties in Dewey's Anthropocentric Naturalism," *The Philosophical Review*, no. 290, March, 1940, p. 196. This article is a thorough exposure of many of the weaknesses of Dewey's philosophy.

<sup>7</sup> *Freedom and Culture*, p. 112.



Dewey's own reiterated assertions of his Instrumentalism, a process of wearing down the psychological resistance of the reader until he succumbs. And since he discounts the past we cannot test the doctrine except by future experiences, which, when they occur, immediately become the past. Hutchins is not for indoctrination, he is for putting all the evidence on the table—metaphysical and perennial as well as ephemeral. Like other men with no personal philosophical axe to grind, he is convinced that once a truth has been established with certainty it cannot be completely scrapped

by some subsequent discovery. A *truth*, that is. A feeling may indeed be replaced by its contrary. But if the forte of our philosophy is feeling, then we are not educating for freedom; we are promoting that divisive factor which calls for the dictator. In the present gigantic struggle against dictators, let us hope that the efficacy for immediate ends, advocated by Dewey, may not be permitted to serve only the passions of the moment but be made to implement the sound and perennial principles of the Declaration of Independence, the principles of true social progress.

## Causality in the Philosophy of Nature

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IN a recent paper, following the lead of St. Thomas, I advanced the following proposition: "An antecedent form of the same degree of perfection is necessary only in univocal (*per se*) generation," but not in equivocal generation.<sup>1</sup> This statement, the key to the general thesis of that paper, has been questioned on several grounds. It has also its own importance for the philosophy of nature.

Two independent objections have been given. One is that the solution is inadequate, because it consists in the substitution of an efficient for a formal cause. The second is that, since no finite cause produces a substantial form, the whole discussion is pointless. These two positions will be considered in inverse order.

### *Deus dat formam*

For the statement that God alone causes substantial form, two reasonings are advanced. The first says: since form gives being (*forma dat esse*), and since only God is being, God alone can cause form. The second is more involved; it proceeds along the following path. That which immediately acts in creaturely causation is an accident (operation) and that which is immediately effected is another accident (disposition). But that which is finally effected—the substance—cannot be greater in perfection than its cause. Hence, these accidents cannot cause substantial forms. But new substantial forms do appear. Hence, all substantial changes are disposed to by finite causes but effected by the First Cause.<sup>2</sup>

The first position, which is a mitigated occasionalism, can be disposed of rather briefly. Experience would seem to show that finite agents do effect substantial changes. A philosophical analysis of the created cause shows that it cannot operate without the cooperation of God. To pass further and say that God alone effects substantial changes can be done only on the basis of a strict demonstration. The attempted demonstration from the fact that God alone is Being overlooks the fact that creatures, though they are not their own being, yet have true existence. Since a tree actually exists, it can be the reason why a second tree should come to be—in other words, it can effect a substantial change as a secondary cause.<sup>3</sup> Further, to limit creaturely causality to

accidental change is to derogate from God's excellence instead of enhancing it. For, God communicates to His creatures, not only being so that they exist, but also goodness so that they can be the causes of other things. Were this not so, we would have difficulty in showing how God was supremely good. Consequently, this mitigated occasionalism is not only unnecessary, but also false.

An important point to keep in mind in all this discussion is that form (except the human form) is not subsistent; it is only a principle of being. As such, form does not come to be: *forma non fit*, but something becomes in act according to a certain form: *sed ea aliquid fit*.

With regard to the second argument, a more detailed discussion is in place. It is true that if substantial change is to involve two agents: a substance and an accident, and two patients: an accident and a substance, then only the First Cause could produce a new substance.<sup>4</sup> But this position is simply a misunderstanding of the relation between substance and accident. For, on the side of the agent, the accidental form (operation) which immediately acts is not an agent, but simply a quasi-instrument of the substance in virtue of which it acts.<sup>5</sup> On the side of the patient, the alteration of quality does not effect the substantial change, but is a dispositive medium through which the agent acts.<sup>6</sup>

An ameba, having by a local movement of engulfing put itself in proximate position to act upon a piece of food,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* There is an interesting parallel between the metaphysical principle at stake here and the physical law of the conservation of matter. For, though we admit that new matter can come into being only through creation, no one dreams of denying that finite causes can modify matter and energy.

<sup>5</sup> *Agens naturale in generatione agit transmutando materiam ad formam, quod quidem fit secundum quod materia primo disponitur ad formam, et tandem consequitur formam, secundum quod generatio est terminus alterationis; necesse est quod ex parte agentis id quod immediate agit, sit forma accidentalis correspondens dispositioni materiae; sed oportet quod forma accidentalis agat in virtute formae substantialis, quasi instrumentum eius. Quaestio unica de Anima, a. 12 (Quaestiones Disputatae,<sup>5</sup> Turin, Marietti, 1927: 5 vols.), 5.144. (This edition will be used for the *Quaestiones Disputatae* and the *Quodlibeta* in the form: *Qq. Dis.*); cf. *Quodlibetum IX*, a. 10 (*q. Dis.*) 5.195-196; 2 *Sent.*, d. 1, 1. 4 ad 5.*

<sup>6</sup> *Accidens non corrumpit subiectum effective, sed dispositive. Quodlibetum X*, a. 3 (*Qq. Dis.*) 5.205a. quia etiam in naturalibus ab eodem agente fit materia in ultima dispositione ad formam et recipit formam. 4 *Sent.*, d. 24, 2. 2 ad 1 (Parma, 1858, 72), p. 897b.

<sup>7</sup> Non enim augmentatur aliquid nisi praeeistente alteratione, per quam quod prius erat dissimile, convertatur et fiat simile; neque alteratio potest esse nisi praeeistente loci mutatione, quia ad hoc quod fiat alteratio, oportet quod alterans magis sit propinquum alterato nunc quam prius.

*Sum. c. Gent.* 3. 82 (Leonine manual edition), p. 321b.

<sup>1</sup> "Causality and Evolution," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN* 19 (1941), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> This is approximately the argument of D. Nys, *Cosmologie*,<sup>2</sup> Louvain, Institut Superior de Philosophie, 1906, pp. 368-372; it is strangely reminiscent of the summary of Avicenna's position given in 2 *Sent.*, d. 1, 1. 4c, where it is explicitly solved.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the distinctions made in the article cited in note 1, with the references.



begins to act upon it by way of its enzymes. These, by operations (which are accidents) cause modifications (also accidental) in the food. It is aside from the point to enquire whether there is only one substantial change, or a series of them in the change from food to living thing. At any rate, the process continues until the food is completely assimilated, when it ceases to be food and becomes part of the ameba. The ameba thus grows, and becomes larger than its form would normally ordain it to be.<sup>8</sup> Again a local movement begins the series of operations, in which, by way of a new arrangement of parts, qualitative changes are introduced into the animal which result in two new individual animals.

### *Creaturely Causation*

Before the third objection can be answered, a deeper study must be made of causality. The metaphysical principle of causality: whatever does not exist by its very nature, has a cause for its existence, is a first principle and comparatively easy to understand. So is the metaphysical notion of cause: a principle by whose influence something is. But, like the concept of being from which these concepts flow, they are analogous. Consequently, they are concretized differently with regard to creatures and to God. When God causes, His activity is spoken of as creation. His activity is proportioned to His nature, so that it is supremely independent and total in respect of the effect. When a creature causes, substantially its activity is spoken of as generation. The creature's activity is likewise proportioned to its nature, so that it is dependent on the concurrence of God on the active side. In respect of the effect, creaturely causation is only partial, in the sense that it can work only within the limits of a preexisting subject.<sup>9</sup>

When we transpose the concepts in question to the order of material being, further specifications are necessary. For, the cause now exists under the limitations of matter, and so in its activity is subject to the conditions of time and space. The preexisting subject for material causation is itself a material thing.

### *Matter, the Principle of Substantial Becoming*

A material thing, in the Thomistic analysis, is found to be triply potential. As a creature, it is not its own existence, and so is composed, in the existential order, of a potential principle: essence, and an actuating principle: existence. Likewise, as a creature, it is not its own operation, and so, in the operative order, is composed of a potential principle: substance, and an actuating principle: accident. As a material being, it is not its own essential act, and so, in the essential order, is composed of a potential principle: first matter, and an actuating principle: form.

As a thing exists, so it acts or is acted upon.<sup>10</sup> But a material thing exists, not only with the determination of the substantial form, but with the second actuation of accidental forms. Hence, the creature, which must take the object of its actions as it is,<sup>11</sup> must act on the patient by way of

accidental mutation.<sup>12</sup> Only God can produce a substance directly.<sup>13</sup>

The form of the substance to be generated does not pre-exist in the matter like a Jack-in-the-box, ready to pop out upon the presence of a cause similar to it. Nor is the education of a substantial form as simple a thing as the impression of an image in wax. The cause cannot generate a new substance by modifying the preceding form, since forms as such are act in their line of perfection, and so do not admit of being changed except by being interchanged.

A thing can be acted upon only by reason of the potency it has. The essential potency of a thing is first matter. But first matter is not a physical existent, nor do we find a naked matter-form composite. Hence, first matter can be attacked by a created cause only through the medium of accidental modification.

But this throws no unbridgeable chasm between the accidental modification and the substantial result. They meet in the transcendental relation of first matter to accidental as well as substantial forms, since matter is potency in all genera.<sup>14</sup> Hence, an accidental modification of the sort which leads to generation is by its relation to matter already orientated toward a substantial change; it is by thus actuating the potency of the matter<sup>15</sup> that new beings are generated.

### *Alteration and Generation*

What kind of accidental change leads to substantial generation? The categories of accidents are: quantity, quality, action, passion, relation, when, where, *situs*, and *habitus*. Several of these can readily be eliminated from consideration here. When, where, *situs* and *habitus* are all extrinsic: the first by reference to the external measure of time, the second to the external measure of space, to which the third adds something intrinsic (the order of parts in that place) which can be reduced to quality (namely, the order of parts), and the fourth, by reference to an instrumental conjunction.<sup>16</sup> The category of action obviously cannot be pertinent to this question. The category of passion is indeed pertinent, for, "passion is terminated in the subject which suffers the action,"<sup>17</sup> but it will not advance the consideration, for, the question is: what is immediately changed in the patient when it is acted upon by an agent so that a substantial change results? There are left, then, the three predicaments intrinsic to the subject:<sup>18</sup> quantity, quality, and relation. The category of relation in that which is peculiar to itself cannot be in question, for, though intrinsic, it is wholly orientated

mutationis; quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectum, absque alia immutatione effectus huiusmodi formam vel dispositionem conservat. *S. T. I.* 104. 2 ad 3.

<sup>13</sup> Hoc autem differt inter operationem creaturae, et operationem divinam: quod quia Deus sua operatione non solum formam, sed etiam materiam producit; non praexigit eius operatio, sicut nec materiam, ita nec materialem dispositionem ad effectum perficiendum; nec tamen formam sine materia aut sine dispositione facit, sed simul potest materiam et formam dare unica operatione; vel etiam materiam quantumcumque indispositam ad debitam dispositionem reducere, quae competit perfectioni quam inducit.

*De Ver.* 12. 4 (*Qq. Dis.*), 3.289.

<sup>14</sup> Materia transmutatur non tantum transmutatione accidentali, sed etiam substantiali; utraque enim forma in materiae potentia praexistit; unde agens naturale quod materiam transmutat, non solum est causa formae accidentalis, sed etiam substantialis. *De Pot.* 3. 11 ad 10.

<sup>15</sup> Dispositio enim reducitur ad causam materialem si accipiat dispositio quae disponit materiam ad recipiendum. 4 *Sent.*, d. 17, 2. 5, sol., 1 (Parma, 1858, 72), p. 791b.

<sup>16</sup> *In III Physic.*, lect. 5 (Ed. Leon., II), p. 114.

<sup>17</sup> *In V Metaph.*, lect. 9 (Cathala), nos. 890-892.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Compare the interesting statement: Equus enim habet quantitatem dimensionem determinatam secundum naturam cum aliqua latitudine. Est enim aliqua quantitas ultra quam nullus equus protenditur in magnitudine. Et similiter est aliqua quantitas, quam non transcendit in parvitate.

*In V Metaph.*, lect. 18 (Cathala,<sup>3</sup> Turin, Marietti, 1935), no. 1037.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.* 2. 21.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the common axioms: "agere sequitur esse," and, "quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis."

<sup>11</sup> Omnis autem creatura necesse habet uti subiecto ad hoc quod aliquid faciat, nec potest facere nisi ad quod subiectum est in potentia. *Sum. c. Gent.* 3. 102, p. 351a.

<sup>12</sup> Nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius quantum ad hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum alicuius



to something else. This leaves only the two categories of quantity and quality.

The change of quantity, either by increase (augmentation) or decrease (diminution) of itself has no relation to substantial change. It is a matter of experience that living things, in which this kind of change is most noticeable, keep their nature and individuality in so changing. Further, the very nature of quantity, which holds itself rather on the side of matter as potency,<sup>19</sup> does not directly relate it to substantial change, which involves matter as related to form. It is true that division and union of things can by themselves mediate a substantial change, but this happens only in so far as *situs* (which is based on quality) and frequently figure (which is a quality) are involved.<sup>20</sup>

There is left, then, that accident known as quality. It is only a change in quality (known as alteration<sup>21</sup>) which leads to generation.<sup>22</sup> This involves two statements: first, that substantial change as effected by a created agent is mediated by accidental change, and second, that the kind of accidental change of itself and directly ordered to substantial change is alteration or change in quality.<sup>23</sup>

Every substantial form has a number of proper qualities; this is a matter of experience. Moreover, though there is a certain tolerance of shape, size, temperature, and the like, there are also limits to this tolerance imposed by the nature of the thing itself. When an external agent induces a change of quality or disposition in the object to be substantially changed, up to the limits of the tolerance there is no substantial change.<sup>24</sup> But the new quality, even when tolerated by way of a passion, is the way to the non-existence (*via ad non-esse*) of the present substance, and at the same time a way to the existence of a new kind of thing, or at least of a new individual<sup>25</sup> (*via ad esse*). If the action of the external agent continues, a substantial change takes place. The alteration can also be by way of a combination<sup>26</sup> or a separation of parts,<sup>27</sup> or a modification of an already existing combination.<sup>28</sup> The more detailed investigation of the particular type of alteration that will lead to any definite chemical, plant, or animal, is not the proper field for philosophical inquiry.

#### Analysis of Generative Activity

Having discovered the elements which come into every generative activity, we can proceed to analyze the dynamic structure of that activity. Why does a thing acting naturally (*per naturam*, as opposed to *per cognitionem*) produce an

effect of the same species as itself? A diagram of the situation will make the answer easy.

SUBSTANCE A (determined by sub. form)      SUBSTANCE A<sup>1</sup>  
 ||      ||  
 OPERATION—ACTION-PASSION—ALTERATION

The double lines represent transcendental relations (of the order of potency and act); the single line represents the actual influence of the cause upon the effect. The italics are used to represent the fact that the two accidents in question are in the order of instrumental cause.<sup>29</sup>

Our question was: Why is the generated substance (A<sup>1</sup>) of the same form as the generating cause (A)? Because of the intrinsic finality by which the alteration<sup>30</sup> and operations are ordered to a particular form—an ordering proceeding existentially from the generator. This orientation we may well, with St. Thomas, call the "intention of nature."<sup>31</sup>

There is then a double relation in the very act of causing: looking back to the cause is the relation of dependence; looking forward to the final effect is the intention of nature. The final perfection (form) of the effect is the apriori condition of the possibility of the alteration, in the sense in which every act is prior in being, though posterior in time, to the potency in which it is generated and from which it is educed.

#### Form and Equivocal Generation

This analysis of univocal (*per se*) generation paves the way for the discussion of the relation of forms in equivocal generation. A diagram may be helpful here also.

IMMEDIATE CAUSE A (determined by sub. form)      SUBSTANCE B  
 ||      ||  
 OPERATION      ACTION-PASSION ALTERATION  
 ||      ||  
 GENERAL CAUSE G (determined by its form,  
 directed by Intelligence).

We will suppose that by the concurrence of causes A and G, an effect, specifically different from both: B, is generated.<sup>31a</sup> Why is B determined to the form which it has? Because the particular alteration caused has a transcendental relation to that form, which has antecedently determined the altera-

<sup>29</sup> Dynamically, the alteration is in the genus of efficient cause, namely, instrument (cf. notes 5 and 6); statically, it is in the genus of material cause (cf. note 15), since it holds itself on the side of potency to form.

<sup>30</sup> In generatione autem forma non habet causalitatem, nisi per modum finis. Finis enim et forma in generatione incident in idem numero. *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 3 (Cathala), no. 1202. Hoc est naturam appetere finem, scilicet habere aptitudinem naturalem ad finem. *In II Physic.*, lect. 13, p. 93a.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Sum. c. Gent.* 3.22, p. 247; *In VII Metaph.*, lect. 7, no. 1433.

<sup>31a</sup> It would be supremely desirable in this matter to have the fact certain, and to know its manner of occurring. But the natural occurrence of such cases would be very rare and also completely unpredictable. Further, the complex nature of the situation would demand in an observer considerable skill and knowledge of the causes involved. The one case that might be thought of as supplying at least the data for the fact—the appearance of "sports" in the plant kingdom—is unfortunately not a deciding case, since there is no conclusive evidence, acceptable to all parties, that new species are thus generated.

The geneticists have been working for a number of years now on the artificial production of mutants. As yet, the evidence seems to be against these artificially produced plants or animals being new species, since they seem to be due more to a defect in the matter—they are said to be due to weakened or destroyed genes; cf. William Bateson, *Problems of Genetics*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916, pp. 97-117. Far from being afraid of the findings of biologists, we have good reason to await them eagerly.

In the absence of the ascertained fact, only one procedure is open. This is an apriori procedure, working from the constitutive parts of the complex concept "equivocal generation" to see whether there is any intrinsic repugnance. The assumption of the algebraically annotated case is not a *petitio principii*—it is the test case in which the repugnance or compossibility are to be found. If there is no repugnance, then the conclusion: "equivocal generation is ontologically possible" is established. The method of course will never enable one to say that it has ever happened.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *In I De Generatione et Corruptione*, lect. 10 (Ed. Leon., III), p. 299a.

<sup>21</sup> *In I De Generatione et Corruptione*, lect. 10, p. 300b.

<sup>22</sup> Alteratio est via ad generationem et corruptionem. *De Mixtione Elementorum* (Parma, 1865, 16), p. 353a.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *In De Generatione et Corruptione, prooemium* (Ed. Leon., III), p. 261.

<sup>24</sup> S. T. I-II. 52. 1; cf. *In Boetium de Trinitate* 5.4 ad 4 (*Opuscula Omnia*, ed. Mandonnet, Paris, 1927; 5 vols. P, 3. 121; *In V Metaph.*, lect. 18, no. 1037, lect. 22, no. 1143).

<sup>25</sup> When a new individual of the same kind is produced, as in budding, fission, or the cutting up of lower forms of life, a true substantial change takes place.

<sup>26</sup> If there are true substantial changes within the physico-chemical level, they are the best examples of this.

<sup>27</sup> Unde manifestum est, quod omnis substantia corruptibilis vel est composita ex diversis partibus per quarum dissolutionem sequitur corruptio totius, sicut patet in corporibus mixtis: aut forma indiget materiali substituto ad sui sustentationem: et ita per transmutationem substituti sequitur corruptio, sicut patet in corporibus simplicibus, et in accidentibus. *In Librum de Causis*, lect. 27 (Parma, 1867, 21), p. 755b.

<sup>28</sup> As in the natural death of an animal, or, perhaps, in the polymerization of certain compounds.



tion by way of apriori condition.<sup>32</sup> The operations of causes A and G are determined by their substantial forms. The alteration itself is determined by the mutually interfering influences of A and G, which result in a passion in B qualitatively equivalent<sup>33</sup> to that caused by a generator of the order B.<sup>34</sup> Taken separately, therefore, each item is completely determined, and so all the requirements of causality are fulfilled.

But the forward- and backward-looking relations mentioned above are all askew. Where in this hypothetical case does the finality and ordering come from? From the higher (Divine) Intelligence, which imposes the requisite unity and relationship *per modum actus*. The "intention of nature" is substituted for by an intention of intellect.

#### *Solution of the Objection*

The objection which precipitated this discussion was: the explanation of incidental or equivocal (*per accidens*) generation as due to the providentially guided interference of a general with an immediate cause substitutes an efficient for a formal cause. In the light of what has been said, it will be clear that this objection misstates the case. For, instead of substituting an efficient cause for the determining formal cause, the solution substitutes three formal causes for one:

two of the order of substantial form, the third, unifying these two, of the order of intentional form.

<sup>32</sup> Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine, seu termino. Differt enim calefactio ab infrigidatione secundum quod haec a calido, scilicet activo, ad calidum, illa autem a frigido ad frigidum procedit. *S. T. I. 77. 3c.*

<sup>33</sup> The concrete meaning of "equivalence" in alteration is hard to give, but here we have at least an analogy. The complicated chemical procedures used to bring about artificial parthenogenesis bring about the same results within the ovum which the sperm does. Although the equivalence here is only imperfect, it shows how even the human intellect can adapt interfering causes to effect an action to which they are not naturally ordered. The procedures, as exemplified in the work of Jacques Loeb, illustrate how intellect can bring unity and purpose into disparate causes. However, the example is far from being adequate to the case in point.

<sup>34</sup> It is necessary to note here that the chance interference of A and G could never cause B. But, as was indicated in the preceding article, the concept of equivocal generation involves that of Providence. How does this help? St. Thomas, *S. T. I. 70. 3 ad 3*, affords the solution. As long as A and G are considered as principal causes, there will result either substance A<sup>1</sup> as in the first diagram, or nothing. It is definitely possible that at least one cause act more like an instrument than simply a secondary cause: in generatione equivoca, causa generalis plus accedit ad rationem instrumenti. Therefore, though of themselves the causes are not apt to cause B, yet, acting instrumentally, (in a manner similar, but immeasurably superior to, that mentioned in note 33) they are adapted, by being unified and directed by the Divine Intellect to cause B.

## The Notion of Human Liberty in Suarez

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NO philosopher's thought can be fully understood with all its implications unless he is situated in his proper historical perspective. Of few scholastic thinkers is this more true than of Suarez, for few have been so steeped in philosophical tradition or borrowed so freely from their predecessors. Yet, strange to say, very little really scholarly work has been done so far along the line of historical investigation into the relation between Suarez and his predecessors. What little has been done, however, has revealed some extremely interesting results, and perhaps on no point more than in his theory of human liberty. The present paper is intended as an introduction to the study of Suarez' doctrine of liberty, as approached from the historical rather than the systematic viewpoint.

There are four principal sources for this doctrine in the works of Suarez:<sup>1</sup>

- (1) *De Gratia, Prolegomenon I: De Requisitis ad Formalem Libertatem*;
- (2) *Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disp. XIX* (sect. 2-10): *De Causis Libere Agentibus*;
- (3) *Opusculum Theologicum Primum: De Concursu Dei ad Actus Liberi Arbitrii*;
- (4) *Tractatus Secundus ad Primam Secundae Divi Thomae: De Voluntario* (disp. 6, 8, 9, 10).

The first three of these treat of liberty *ex professo*; the fourth, too often neglected, offers an indispensable complement to the others by its discussion of the relations between intellect and will—the real key, as we shall see later, to Suarez' conception of liberty. In our exposition we shall deliberately

follow Suarez' own sequence and method of procedure, as only thus can his own particular approach to and handling of the problem be appreciated.

#### *Existence of Liberty*

In only one of his works does Suarez even touch upon the question of proving the existence of free will from reason. This work, the *19th Metaphysical Disputation*, gives three rather summary arguments.<sup>2</sup> The first is from the common consent of mankind and of philosophers in particular. Man in general has always tacitly assumed the existence of free will and acted accordingly; the philosophers, too, e. g., Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Fathers of the Church in their philosophical writings, have all maintained the same truth.

The second proof is from the testimony of consciousness. We all experience without a doubt the fact that it lies in our power to perform or not to perform a certain action, or to perform this action instead of that, and it is to this end that we employ rational deliberation with ourselves. Therefore we must have in our power the capacity to make free elections, otherwise this power of deliberation would have been given us in vain.

The third proof is the metaphysical argument, or the argument "*ex ratione a priori*," which is derived from the mode and perfection of cognition in an intellectual being. Liberty is born from reason, for the vital appetite follows upon cognition. Therefore the more perfect the mode of cognition, the more perfect will be the appetite accompanying it. Now intellectual knowledge is so perfect and universal in its mode of operation that it is capable of perceiving the relation of means to an end, of weighing the goodness or evil, the utility or disproportion of each means, and hence of discerning

<sup>1</sup> *Opera Omnia*, Luis Vivès, Paris, 1856-78, 28 vols. These four treatises are found respectively in vol. VII, pp. 1-44; vol. XXV, pp. 693-738; vol. XI, pp. 4-90; vol. IV, pp. 242-74.

<sup>2</sup> *Disp. Metaph. XIX*, sect. 2, nos. 12-17, vol. XXV, p. 696 ff.



which is necessary to the attainment of the end and which is indifferent. Therefore the appetite which follows such a mode of cognition will necessarily possess this same perfection of indifference, so that it will not be constrained to tend necessarily to every good or every means, but to each one only in proportion to the degree of goodness contained within it. Hence a good which has been judged not necessary but indifferent will be loved not necessarily but freely. Thus it is that free election follows upon rational deliberation.

A number of remarks suggest themselves with regard to these proofs. The first one, it is all too obvious, is not really a philosophical proof at all, but merely presents a strong motive of "moral probability" for the existence of free will. Moreover, it rests on an exceedingly dubious interpretation of Plato and the Stoics, and perhaps Aristotle also, since, granted that they did admit a certain indetermination of the will resembling liberty, it is very doubtful whether they understood it in the strict sense of spiritual liberty as a positive perfection which it connotes for a Christian.<sup>3</sup> The appeal to the unanimity of philosophers, also, sounds singularly unconvincing when we think of the Arabian philosophers, Luther, Calvin, and various others in Suarez' own time, as well as Spinoza, John Stuart Mill and others in modern times. Evidently, therefore, this argument is little more than a quick and superficial introduction to the other two, one of those rare cases where Suarez can be held guilty of a hasty and unproved generalization.

The second proof from consciousness is a far stronger one. Yet it too is based upon an extremely controverted point, and in order to be adequate would have to be elaborated with far more thoroughness and care than Suarez bestows on it. Many philosophers, including some before Suarez' time, have denied that it is possible to be conscious of liberty in the strict sense of the word. They maintain that the most we can ever be conscious of is an actually present fact or state, never of a possibility, as Suarez claims. Hence we can indeed be conscious that we *are* doing or have done this particular action, but never that we *could* do or could have done the opposite action. It is not our intention, however, to enter into a discussion on this difficult and much controverted point. We simply wish to point out that a proof of this kind, before it can be of real weight, must be very carefully developed and explained, and the main objections against it thoroughly refuted. Suarez merely outlines the argument in a brief and elementary way, stopping only to refute one very minor objection about the apparent success of threats and rewards on animals. Moreover, he himself concedes that the evidence of this inner experience is not so overwhelming as to eliminate all possibility of "tergiversation."<sup>4</sup>

From a philosophical point of view, then, the third or metaphysical argument, though rather briefly developed in comparison with Suarez' usual fullness, is the one that has the most interest and carries the most weight. Now the significant point about the above argument is this: it links Suarez decisively with the Thomistic as opposed to both the Scotistic and Nominalistic traditions on the capital point of the source and *raison d'être* of free will in man. As is well

known, the characteristic note of the Thomistic tradition is the intimate relation established between intellect and will, so that liberty can be deduced from and explained by the very fact of man's being a rational creature endowed with a universal mode of cognition.<sup>5</sup> For Scotus and the Nominalists, on the other hand, there is a primary division of causes into "natural" (or determined) and free; and since the intellect falls under the natural causes and the will under the free, there is a radical difference of nature between them, so that the mode of operation of the one can in no way be deduced from the mode of operation of the other. The explanation of liberty must therefore be sought in the *will alone*, and can in no wise be derived from the mode of operation of the intellect, which is essentially a "natural" or determined agent.<sup>6</sup> Now the argument of Suarez outlined above is practically a reproduction, though in summary form, of the reasoning of St. Thomas. That he intends it to be such, and understands it in the authentic Thomistic sense, is clear from his repeated assertions of agreement with the Thomists on the point that liberty has its source in the reason, and his explicit acceptance of the traditional Thomistic formula: "*radix libertatis in ratione est.*"<sup>7</sup>

On this first major point, therefore, of the existence of liberty and the metaphysical explanation of its origin, Suarez has allied himself definitely with the Thomistic tradition.

#### Nature of Liberty

In seeking to understand Suarez' conception of the nature of the free act, it is essential to grasp from the start his peculiar method of procedure. He does not proceed, as does St. Thomas, by analyzing the structure of the soul and its faculties and thus arguing to the nature and mode of operation of liberty. Rather he starts from the *fact* of free will and its exercise and argues back to the necessary *conditions of possibility* for its existence in man. It is a fact that man is free and actually performs free acts. This has been established as a certainty both from reason and revelation. Now given the existence of liberty and its actual exercise in man, what are the conditions required to render this existence possible?<sup>8</sup> Such is the rather original method adopted by Suarez.

He begins his exposition by laying down a working definition of liberty, which he characterizes, according to the traditional formula handed down by Peter Lombard, as *facultas voluntatis et rationis*.<sup>9</sup> It is significant, however, that very soon he simply drops the term *rationis* without a word of explanation, and henceforth speaks only of the *facultas voluntatis*. It is significant also that right from the beginning (in common, this time, with both the Scotistic and Nominalistic

<sup>5</sup> *De Ver.* 24, 1c; *De Malo*, 6; *S. T.* I, 82, 1-2; 83, 1c; I-II, 9, 10, 13. For a general summary see also Sertillanges, *St. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1910, 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 206-88, one of the best modern expositions of the Thomistic position.

<sup>6</sup> Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*, lib. IX, q. 15, nos. 4-5; *Opera Omnia*, (ed. L. Wadding) Lyons, 1639, 12 vols., vol. IV, p. 797-8. See also *Opus Oxoniense*, lib. I, dist. 1, q. 4, no. 1, vol. V, p. 207; *ibid.*, II, 25, 1, 23; I, 1, 4, 16; I, 2, 7, 33; *Quodlibet*, q. 16, no. 6. For a general summary cf. E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, Paris, 1932, 2 vols., v. II, chap. 5, 105-9.

<sup>7</sup> Igitur indifferentia in actibus voluntatis provenit ex iudicio rationis, ut recte docet D. Thomas (I, q. 83, art. 1 etc.), quem Thomistae eisdem locis sequuntur. (*Disp. Met.* XIX, sect. 5, no. 21). See also *Disp. Met.* XIX, sect. 2, no. 17: Libertas ex intelligentia nascitur, nam appetitus vitalis sequitur cognitionem. . . . Also *Opusculum Theologicum I*, cap. 2, no. 6, vol. XI, p. 10: Indifferentia iudicii optime dicitur a peritioribus Theologis radix libertatis . . . quo fit ut illa etiam indifferentia iudicii sit sufficiens argumentum et origo facultatis liberae.

<sup>8</sup> *De Gratia, Prolegomenon I*, cap. 2: "Quae Sunt Necessaria Ut Potentia Sit Libera et Libere Operetur," vol. VII, p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 1, no. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. G. Fonsegrive, *Essai sur le Libre Arbitre: Théorie et Histoire*, Paris, 1887, Livre I, chap. 2: "Platon"; chap. 3: "Aristote"; chap. 5: "Le Stoicisme"; chap. 6: "Les Traités de Fato." See also any standard study on these authors.

<sup>4</sup> Experimentum hoc non est ita perspicuum ac per se notum, quin homini protervo relinquitur aliquis tergiversandi locus. (*Disp. Met.* XIX, sect. 2, no. 15).



schools) and again without a word of explanation, he introduces the term "indifference" as inseparable from, if not synonymous with, the word liberty.<sup>10</sup> Though it is a fundamental point of controversy between the Thomists and the other schools, the most that Suarez ever does is to enquire *what kind* of indifference, i. e., active or passive, is required for liberty, never whether indifference itself (i. e., the indifference of the will in a given situation to act or not act) is of the essence of the free act.

With this starting point clearly laid down, Suarez now proceeds to the deduction of the conditions of possibility necessary to explain the existence of liberty in man. This can be summed up in a few words, as, given the starting point and the explanation of the terms which we have just seen, it proceeds with the most rigorous logic. The deduction contains four progressive steps. *First*: A power which is *formaliter libera* must be an active power. This is evident, since a passive agent, as such, is never able of itself to act or not to act. *Second*: The indifference required of a free power must be an *indifferentia dominativa*, that is, the indifference to act or not act must come from dominion over its acts, not from mere impotence to act, since this could be said just as well of natural or determined agents. *Third*: *Complete* active dominion over its acts is required in a free power, since if its dominion were only partial it would always remain impotent to act without the assistance of an outside power. *Fourth*: This active indifference must be not only *remote*, i. e., belonging to the faculty "*secundum se et nude spectata*," but must also be *proximate*, i. e., belonging to the faculty at the very moment of acting, "*cum omnibus requisitis ad agendum*;" otherwise the actual exercise of liberty would never be possible and the possession of a free faculty would be a mere empty delusion. This text marks the first use of the celebrated formula "*cum omnibus requisitis ad agendum*," introduced without comment or explanation.<sup>11</sup>

Having completed the analysis of these necessary conditions of possibility, Suarez now sums them all up in the well-known definition: "*Potestas libera est quae, positis omnibus praerequisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere*."<sup>12</sup> This definition, Suarez says, has been rejected by some as not coming from Aristotle, St. Thomas, or other doctors of authority, but invented by the Nominalists. None the less, he replies, it is an excellent one, and handed down by weighty authorities, either in the same or equivalent terms. In proof of this statement he cites the following list of names: Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Ockham, Hervaeus Natalis, Marsilius of Inghen, Dionysius the Carthusian, Gabriel Biel, Dominic Soto, Gregory of Valencia (a contemporary Jesuit) and a few others, all of whom were either professed Scotists or Nominalists, or else known to have definite Scotistic or Nominalistic leanings.<sup>13</sup> As for St. Thomas, Suarez declares that his own definition is merely a more complete and rigorous formulation of St. Thomas' words: "*Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem; unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis*."<sup>14</sup> The identification of these two formulas, it must be admitted, is far from being as evident as Suarez seems to believe, at least to the eyes of a Thomist.

### Seat of Liberty

Having determined the characteristics of the free power, Suarez' next step is to discover in which of the faculties of man—intellect, will, or intellect and will together—this power resides. His reasoning is simple. If it can be proved that liberty can in no way be attributed to the intellect, then it follows that it can reside neither in the intellect alone nor in the intellect in conjunction with the will, but solely in the will. Now it is obvious that liberty, or active indifference in the presence of its object, cannot be attributed to the intellect. The intellect is determined by its very nature to assent to the true and dissent from the false. If the truth of the object is present with sufficient evidence, the intellect is bound to assent by natural necessity; if it is not evident, the intellect is incapable of determining itself without the intervention of the will. Such indifference, if it might be called such, is due solely to imperfection of vision, not at all to internal dominion over its acts, as in the case of the will. Hence liberty cannot be attributed to the intellect in any sense of the word. It must therefore be attributed solely to the will and reside in it alone. Suarez' expression could not be stronger: "*Voluntas est liberum arbitrium*."<sup>15</sup>

But what of the traditional Thomistic theory that the free election is a synthesis of both intellect and will in one indivisible but composed human act, with each one determining the other by "reciprocal causality"—the intellect determining the will in the order of formal or final causality, the will determining the intellect in the order of moving or efficient causality? Suarez' reactions to this theory are most interesting. Such a position, he declares, cannot even be comprehended, let alone coherently exposed. It would mean that an effect could simultaneously determine its own cause, which is absurd. For this mutual influx of intellect on will and vice versa must after all be in some *one* order of causality, which can only be that of "effective application;" but in this same order one act must certainly precede the other, hence a circle within the same genus of causality is impossible.<sup>16</sup> It should be noted here that Suarez does not actually refute the essential point of the Thomistic theory, namely, the mutual influence of intellect and will in *different* orders of causality, but merely sets it aside as incomprehensible, transposes the problem to one of reciprocal influence in the *same* order of causality, and then demonstrates that this is absurd, which of course it is, but which is not the Thomistic theory. This method of refutation is not infrequent, it must be added, even among the best philosophers.

### Intellect and Will

When confronted, however, with certain very explicit texts of St. Thomas on the election as a synthesis of both intellect and will, such as the well-known text: "*Electio materialiter quidem est voluntatis, formaliter autem rationis*," Suarez finds himself considerably embarrassed, and is obliged to confess candidly that he finds this text "*valde obscurum*." He then proceeds to explain it away by saying these words cannot mean that the intellect really does anything in the election, but merely prepares it.<sup>17</sup>

We have now reached the very core of Suarez' doctrine

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 1, no. 9.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 2, no. 14.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 3, no. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. De Wulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy*, (tr. by E. Messenger) London, 1926, 2 vols.; also *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, Paris, 1911.

<sup>14</sup> *De Gratia*, Prol. I, cap. 3, no. 5. Cf. S. T. I-II. 1. 1c.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, cap. 3, no. 7; also *Disp. Met.* XIX, sect. 5 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Hoc neque exponi neque intelligi potest, nam . . . effectus non potest applicari causae, deinde haec mutua applicatio non est sine aliquo genere causalitatis: ergo necessario unus actus debet alterum antecedere, saltem natura: quare impossibilis est ille circulus in eodem genere causae, scil. effective applicantis. (*De Voluntario*, Disp. VI, sect. 6, nos. 4-5, vol. IV, p. 249.) See also *Disp. Met.* XIX, sect. 6, nos. 5-6.



of liberty, the real key to his handling of the whole problem: namely, his conception of the relations between intellect and will. Summed up briefly, according to the *19th Metaphysical Disputation* and especially the *De Voluntario* (the fourth treatise mentioned above), this conception is as follows. Intellect and will both have a part to play in the production of the free act, but successively, not simultaneously. The intellect first presents the possible alternatives of action, deliberates, and proposes motives for each of the alternatives. These motives are sufficient so that the will *can* act rationally, not determining so that it *must* act. The will remains actively indifferent up to the very moment of its own choice. Here the role of the intellect ceases. Now the will enters in and freely elects whichever of the alternatives it chooses, solely through its own inner autonomy and dominion over its acts. After this, and only in virtue of the act of the will, the intellect enters in again to lay down a "last practical judgment" or *imperium*—"fac hoc"—which is not strictly necessary but aids in the speed and efficiency of the execution. Thus the intellect prepares and makes possible the election, the will alone elects.<sup>17</sup>

Now what is the necessary basis or fundamental supposition underlying such a conception? It seems to be this: that there is a certain radical disjunction (separation would perhaps be too strong) between intellect and will that makes it impossible for them ever to unite in the production of one indivisible, though composed, human act. Thus they must always act to produce an aggregate of *two* acts, one after the other, never both together to produce a single act. Like oil and water, they can never mix. This fundamental conception, never explicitly formulated by Suarez anywhere in his works, seems to constitute, as it were, a tacit presupposition or basic datum on the foundation of which he constructs his whole theory of the operation of the free act, and according to which, whether consciously or not, he refutes every adversary with whom he has to deal.

Now the question arises: from what philosophical school or tradition, if any, does he derive this conception? The answer is clear. This is the identical conception of the relations between intellect and will characteristic of both the Scotistic and Nominalistic traditions since their beginning shortly after the death of St. Thomas. Will and intellect, according to them, are radically opposed as two essentially different genera of causes, the one being by essence free, the other by essence determined. Liberty, therefore, must have its source in the very nature of the will itself, and can in no

way be directly derived from the intellect or its mode of operation. As Scotus forcefully says, if it be asked why the will has such a power of free election and the intellect not, the answer is simply that there is no other reason save that it is a will and that kind of cause.<sup>18</sup> The opposition here between the Thomistic and the Scotistic attitudes is clear-cut and indisputable, and according to Scotus, one excludes the other.

Much more could be said here on the Scotistic affiliations of Suarez' doctrine as well as on the numerous other important points of his theory of liberty, but from the principles laid down so far the rest follows with rigorous logic.

It is now possible to draw together the threads of our study and try to reach some conclusion. In his proof for the existence of liberty and explanation of its origin, we have seen that Suarez has made his own the traditional Thomistic conception of liberty as deriving from reason, that is, from the intellect's universal mode of knowledge: *radix libertatis in ratione est*. For his explanation of the nature and mode of operation of liberty, on the other hand, he has taken as a basis the characteristic Scotistic and Nominalistic conception of the relations between intellect and will as of two radically opposed kinds of causes that must always act separately and never fuse in one act. But here a grave difficulty arises. Can an explanation of the existence of liberty based on one concept of the relations between intellect and will be united consistently in the same theory with an explanation of the nature of liberty based on a totally different and opposed concept of the relation of intellect and will?

The writer does not wish to give a categorical answer to this question one way or the other. It seems, however, that this much at least can be said. The position of Scotus, whether true or not, is at least a self-consistent and logical one. So too is the position of St. Thomas. The position of Suarez, on the other hand, to put it in the best light possible, seems to give evidence of a certain unstable equilibrium, which would have to be resolved definitely one way or the other in order to stand forth as a perfectly balanced, self-consistent solution of this many-sided and difficult problem of human liberty. This Suarez himself never did. We leave it to his modern descendants to weigh down the balance one way or the other.

<sup>19</sup> Si ergo hujus differentiae quaeritur causa, quare scilicet . . . voluntas est ex se indeterminata hujus actionis vel oppositae, seu actionis vel non actionis: dici potest quod hujus nulla est causa . . . nec est dare aliquam causam quare sic elicit nisi quia est talis causa . . . Quare voluntas illud volet? Nulla est alia causa nisi quia est voluntas. (*Quaest. in Metaph. Aristotelis*, lib. IX, q. 15, nos. 4-5, *Opera Omnia*, vol. IV, p. 797-8.)

<sup>17</sup> *De Voluntario*, *Disp.* VIII, sect. 1, no. 1. Cf. I-II. 13. 1c.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*; also *Disp. Met.* XIX, sect. 6, nos. 7-10.

Just as a person may be cured in a twofold manner, through the operation of nature alone or through nature with the aid of medicine, so there is a twofold manner of acquiring knowledge, the one when the natural reason of itself comes to a knowledge of the unknown, which is called "discovery," the other when someone extrinsically gives aid to the natural reason, which is called "instruction." Now, in those things which are done by nature and art, art works in the same way and by the same means that nature does, . . . Hence, art is said to imitate nature. Similarly, it happens in the acquisition of knowledge that the one teaching leads another to a knowledge of the unknown in the same way as he (the learner) would lead himself to a cognition of an unknown in discovery. Now, the process of reason in one who arrives at a cognition of an unknown in discovery is the application of general, self-evident principles to definite matters, and proceeding from them to particular conclusions and from these to others. Hence, and according to this, one man is said to teach another because the teacher proposes to another by means of symbols the discursive process which he himself goes through by natural reason, and thus the natural reason of the pupil comes to a cognition of the unknown through the aid of what is proposed to him as with the aid of instruments. As, then, a doctor is said to cause health in a sick person through the operation of nature, so man is said to cause knowledge in another through the operation of the learner's natural reason—and this is to teach. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 11, a. 1.



## Book Reviews

### SAINT THOMAS AND ANALOGY

The Rev. Gerald B. Phelan

Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 58, \$1.50

Father Phelan has given us a worthy addition to the series of Aquinas Lectures. *Saint Thomas and Analogy* is not only a very readable lecture; it is as well a nice statement of the doctrine of St. Thomas.

As Father Phelan indicates, "... the importance of analogy cannot be overestimated. There is not a problem either in the order of being, or in the order of knowledge, or in the order of predicating, which does not depend for its ultimate solution on the principle of analogy" (p. 1). Analogy is not a formula, applied in the same way to every problem. For the philosophy of St. Thomas is a philosophy of being, faced towards an object which is analogical. It transcends the order of clear and distinct ideas, the order of essence, rising to the "luminous obscurity of the mystery of being" (p. 7). In this realm there is light and vision, which come with the realization that "being belongs intrinsically to all that is and to each and every thing *analogically*, that is, in proportion to its nature" (p. 8).

Analogy in the broadest sense means "a comparison based upon any resemblance; a sameness of some sort among different things" (p. 9). Thus used it can mean almost any kind of resemblance. Analogy has a more precise meaning as it is used by Biologists, Philologists, Logicians, Mathematicians, and Philosophers. Only three types of analogy, however, belong to our consideration: (1) in which there is a "proportion in the *being* of the analogated perfection, but not in the concept of it"; this is the analogy of "a generic perfection unequally shared by the species within the genus" (p. 27); (2) in which "the analogated perfection exists intrinsically in only one of the analogates (and is, therefore, univocal), and is applied by the mind proportionately to others on the basis of some relation of causality existing between the prime analogate and the minor analogates" (p. 28); (3) in which the perfection is analogical in its being and in its concept, and exists intrinsically in all analogates, in each according to a different mode.

The first of these types, called the "analogy of inequality" by Cajetan, is really only a special case of univocity or generic predication. The generic nature, predicated univocally, is actually found participated unequally by its species. "For the logician, therefore, who deals only in concepts, this is simply a case of univocal predication, but for the metaphysician and the philosophy of nature which are concerned with the very being of things, it is a case of equivocity" (p. 32).

The second type, the "analogy of attribution," is of itself inadequate for the solution of the problems of metaphysics, since in it only the prime analogate formally possesses the perfection. Attribution, however, when used with the analogy of proper proportionality, upon which it rests, is of value to the metaphysician.

The analogy of proportionality is based on a proportion of proportions. Proper proportionality, as opposed to metaphor, is founded on the "ontological (transcendental) relation in which each being stands to every other being in virtue of the very act of existence whereby all that is exists ... every being exercises the act of existence (*is*) in proportion to its essence" (p. 39). Diversity is rooted in the manifold limitations of act by potency. Unity of beings is present by the order of all that is to the act of existence.

Any one who has worked on the doctrine of analogy in the text of St. Thomas knows the difficulty of that task. Though there are many fine texts, they are isolated, and they present thorny problems of exegesis. Father Phelan's exposition of the doctrine rests solidly on the text of St. Thomas and embodies at the same time the contributions of the great elaborators of that doctrine. As an introduction to a most important problem, this lecture should be a great help to the student.

WILLIAM A. VAN ROO.



### MAN ON HIS NATURE

Sir Charles Sherrington

The Macmillan Co., New York, 1941, pp. 413

This book comes from the pen of a scientist who has gained distinction in his profession of medicine and physiology. In 1932 he received the Nobel Prize for Medicine; he has likewise received honorary degrees from many famous universities. Often he was called in as special lecturer by great schools in England and America. Twice he gave the Gifford lectures at the University of Edinburgh; the present volume contains the substance of the 1937-38 Gifford lectures.

The purpose of the book is to show that the findings of modern science have radically changed our Philosophy of Nature, especially that of human nature. According to the author, modern scientific discoveries have wiped out the differences between the living and the non-living and brought them both under one category—the physico-chemical system. They have convinced the scientist that such notions as vital principle, soul, spirit, free will, final cause, design, First Cause and the like are one and all "anthropisms," projections of the human mind into its "surround," into what philosophers fancy to be the "real" or the existent. Such concepts and principles are all remnants of a mode of thinking endorsed by Aristotle and his medieval followers and adopted by Christians who sought rational support for their religious tenets. But such a system of thought lacked insight into the *how* of nature's workshop, which is afforded only by the investigations of science, and was consequently bent upon finding the *why* of things. Since such procedure leads but to Anthropomorphism, modern man finds it of little interest or value. For the scientist, there survive but two concepts by means of which he can adequately describe and explain whatever is observed in the universe: the Energy-Concept and the Mind-Concept. Both are of earth earthly. They have been brought to their marvelous present status by evolution, a process which is still going on and which will bring man to undreamed-of heights where he directs the forces of Nature instead of being dominated by them, and where Altruism will finally conquer the earth-born selfishness which in his prehuman existence conditioned his survival, as it did that of every form of life. If all this spells Materialism, it is at least not the naive kind of a Democritus or of the 18th-century materialists insofar as it recognizes the supremacy of "Mind" whose operations are not explainable in terms of the Energy-Concept. Still the distinction is a weak one, for the "Mind" also, says the author, is a product and an emergence of evolution.

To consider nature, particularly human nature, from the mere observational point of view leads to an incomplete



and distorted picture of the universe and man. Further, it seems to blind a person to evident facts. To illustrate: Lord Sherrington tries to show that "free-will" as an event "not conditioned by the reaction with the preceding" is scientifically unthinkable (p. 230). He writes, "When I 'choose' a book from the bookcase I react fundamentally as does my microscopic acquaintance, amoeba, confronted by two or more particles, when it takes one of them. A difference between us is that my fancy conjures up several courses to take. Subsequently I experience my act as doing one of them. That is, for its time being, my main act. As we saw I am confined to doing at any moment just one main act. From my fancy's plurality of possibles there emerges my *de facto* singleness of act. It leaves me the impression of a decision. Amoeba doubtless is without the fancy; hence without the impression of a decision." It is hard to see why the choosing is less clearly an observable fact than the "fancy's plurality of possibles."

The same positivistic bias is responsible for the author's misinterpretation of opinions opposed to his own. Thus the view of the mind-body relation as one of pilot and ship is certainly not Aristotle's nor that of medieval Aristotelian philosophers. Again, to show that Renaissance thinkers considered the soul as a sort of flame separable from the body, Lord Sherrington offers a reprint of a 1561 picture representing the scourging of the Apostles (p. 336). The artist in order to identify the figures as Apostles placed fiery tongues over their heads in allusion to the incident narrated in the Acts of the Apostles with which the readers were well acquainted. To the author it is an example that "the spirit-like something came to be regarded as an existence apart from the body." The reviewer is at a loss to characterize with sufficient severity such evidence, if seriously presented.

Many other miscarriages of reasoning could be pointed out, but what has been said is sufficient to show that a person cripples his God-given powers of reasoning if he approaches a problem with a bias. The author is infected with the bias of positivism, with the bias that only scientific observation and description and verification of facts can assure us of truth, with the bias that metaphysical considerations of cause and finality, etc. can lead but to "Anthropism" or to faith or to an *As-if*-Philosophy out of touch with reality.

If the reader wants facts about life and mind and man interestingly and at times dramatically told, he will find them abundantly in the book under review; if he wants true knowledge about the real universe and man he will not find it in Sir Charles Sherrington's *Man on his Nature*. Without Metaphysics Science is not "only true or false," it is simply false.

J. JOSEPH HORST.



## THE LIVING THOUGHTS OF ST. PAUL

*Presented by Jacques Maritain*

*Translated by Harry Lorin Binsse*

*Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1941, pp. 161, \$1.25*

"Saul who is also Paul," "a Hebrew of Hebrews" and "the Apostle to the Gentiles" is the first great convert of the Christian Church. Commissioned by Christ to spread the Gospel to the Gentiles he spent the remaining thirty years of his life in preaching to the peoples of the greater cities on the Mediterranean coast and in counseling them by letters. Fourteen of these Epistles are extant, having been immortalized by incorporation into the body of the New Testament. Throughout the centuries they have been recognized as "the most burning testimony of evangelical love and the most valuable treasury of Christian Doctrine. From this treasury all the Fathers and Doctors—especially

Saint John Chrysostom, Saint Augustine, and Saint Thomas—drew their inspiration; from it Christian thought has always drawn and never will cease to draw nourishment."

This is the treasury which M. Jacques Maritain presents in this book. Desirous to remain in the background and to let the master speak, the author is content to weave together texts from the various Epistles and to point out briefly the great main truths that are embodied in the Apostle's words.

The principal arrangement of the texts is made in view of the three great truths of St. Paul's teaching, which Maritain calls the *Pauline themes*:

(1) *Universality of the Kingdom of God.*


(2) *Primacy of the internal over the external, of the life of grace over exterior observances.*

(3) *The freedom of the sons of God.*

But this is not the complete St. Paul. In subordination to these there are also texts "relating to the more significant of the other elements in Saint Paul's teaching," such as those on the *Mystical Body*, *Charity*, *Christian Marriage*, the *New Man*, etc. Texts in which "the natural fire of an inspiration more profound than all the developments that theology can draw therefrom illumines the whole of Christian dogma and Christian morals, and especially Christology."

The value of this edition, in the reviewer's eyes, lies in three points: first, the excellent grouping of appropriate texts, which allows the reader to investigate St. Paul's complete teaching on each subject; secondly, the insight shown in the brief analyses that precede the more difficult texts; and thirdly, the use in almost all instances of the new Westminster translation of the Sacred Scriptures from the original Greek and Hebrew texts, which clarifies many passages by its new phraseology. These three points combine to make this book an excellent introduction to the reading of Saint Paul as found in the New Testament. One who takes the time to read this little volume with care, and meditates upon the deep truths it contains will become a disciple of St. Paul, and there is no surer step that we can take towards a realization of the perfect Christian life.

ROBERT A. KILLOREN.



## THE ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

Ledger Wood

*Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 263, \$3.00*

The very first page of the preface states the purpose of this essay in philosophical psychology: to re-examine the central issues of epistemology on a triple level—the perceptual, introspective, and conceptual, and to show that there is a single structural pattern for every kind of cognitive situation. The theory of knowledge here defended is referential or intentional rather than representational. Fundamental to the theory is the cognitive transcendence of all knowledge, its character of always being of or about some actual or supposed object "other" than the cognition itself. This referential transcendence is taken as an essential feature of all knowledge.


After an opening chapter on the Knowledge Situation, explaining the general lines of the referential or intentional theory, the author treats successively of Sensory Knowledge, The Perception of "things," Perceptual Memory, Introspective Knowledge, The Knowledge of Other Selves, Conceptual Knowledge, Categorical Knowledge, Formal Knowledge, and Valuational Knowledge. The closing chapter on Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth shows that the individual cognitive processes have their full meaning only



when seen in the perspective of truth which is the end and goal of them all.

The insistence on the need of a sound psychology for any correct system of epistemology is one well worth noting. This concern is evident throughout the essay. The author is striving to do full justice to the realistic view of knowledge, but positivistic and phenomenistic elements mar the effect, especially in the treatment of the third type of cognition, the conceptual. The lower types of cognition are correctly analyzed as partaking of the character of truth and falsehood only when they are embodied in reflective acts of judgment, but too much emphasis is placed on the need for empirical verification in the higher types of cognition. The reality of universals is misunderstood. In avoiding an exaggerated realism there is a swing to the opposite extreme in describing the universals as "non-existent entities." Paraphrasing the words of the preface criticizing the epistemologies against which this essay is directed, we might say of certain elements in the present analysis that no epistemology can be sound which is metaphysically defective, nor any metaphysical analysis of knowledge significant which is philosophically incomplete.

CHRISTIAN L. BONNET.



### SUMMA COSMOLOGIAE

Frederic Saintonge, S.J.

*Imprimerie du Messager, Montreal, 1941, pp. 546*


This volume is the fruit of over twelve years of teaching and thinking on the part of the author, concerning the many vexing problems which face the modern scholastic cosmologist. In general Father Saintonge follows in the footsteps of Father Hoenen who was his teacher at the Gregorian University in Rome. So we are not surprised to find that he has delved into the modern works on Physics, Chemistry, and Mathematics and out of the welter of facts and theories proposed today has tried objectively and fairly to present the arguments for and against the opinions he favors in the book, especially in regard to substance and quantity.

The book is preeminently a textbook. It aims at a concise, ordered account of Cosmology as a philosophical science. Yet, it is ample enough to touch on the philosophical problems suggested by the results of modern sciences. As such it is a handy manual for those who are pursuing the course for the licentiate in philosophy. All of the ten Aristotelian predicaments, except relation, are dealt with in simple, concise Latin, and the numerous scholia consider them in their relationships to Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry. The book is illustrated with charts and diagrams, especially in the more scientific matters, and gives a short descriptive explanation of those conclusions of science which bear on the main matter of the book. The printing and format are such that the logical subordination of the parts of the theses is emphasized. Most of the important objections are included and discussed where necessary. The book contains an ample bibliography on Cosmology and the sciences affecting it, a short history of the subject together with a table of contents which also serves as a synopsis of the book, and finally an index of names and subjects treated.

The treatment of the subject is orientated along the lines of modern Thomistic philosophy so that the final force of the arguments is deeply rooted in metaphysical principles. The author introduces the student to Cosmology by means of a brief, clear exposition of its nature, object and utility. Especially illuminating are the pages which set forth the real nature of cosmological proofs and the place of Cosmology in the hierarchy of sciences.

The book gives evidence of a firm grasp on principles and a determined, orderly approach to scientific fact. It is an admirable blend of what is best in Aristotelian thought and in modern science. One does not feel that the principles of metaphysics are being diluted by imaginative thinking, nor that the facts and theories of the physical and mathematical sciences are misunderstood. The author loses no contact with physical reality, but interprets and suffuses it with the serene light of truths which transcend and escape the senses.

WILLIAM M. KEGEL.



### THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN

Reinhold Niebuhr

*Charles Scribners' Sons, New York, 1941, pp. ix + 306, \$2.75*

The very fact that a man has found a place on the program of the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh can be taken as a guarantee of his unquestionable scholarship and significant thought. In this first volume of *The Nature and Destiny of Man* which deals with "Human Nature" the author lives up to expectations. Of course, in matter and treatment these lectures are by no means intended for popular consumption, but the reader versed in philosophy and theology, whatever his religious or philosophical loyalties, will find in these pages much that is interesting and illuminating, many points with which he can heartily agree, and a definite stimulant to his own thought in the portions to which he cannot subscribe.


The author confesses to "the conviction that there are resources in the Christian faith for an understanding of human nature which have been lost in modern culture." The question of what man is and what his place in the world is, has been a difficult and important one in every system of philosophy. Man appears as part of the world about him, yet somehow as superior to and transcending that world. This body-spirit character of man has been the source of unending controversy. Modern thought attempts to solve the problem by minimizing or eliminating one of the elements. A naturalistic system would explain everything in man in material terms, whereas an idealistic view makes the material a mere product of the thinking mind. Each approach aims at establishing man's individuality but only succeeds in destroying it, either making it secondary to the material class to which he belongs or absorbing it in some form of universal mind. Modern thought makes the evil to which man is subject the result of factors over which he has little or no control and not a matter of his own responsibility. Idealist and naturalist have both made useful contributions to a full understanding of man, but the pictures thus drawn are distorted and false because they ignore one or other of the body-spirit combination in man. The first portion of the book, devoted to this analysis of modern thought, is a splendid piece of work.

The Christian view of man, on the other hand, bases itself on the Biblical revelation and sees the compound being, man, essentially as a creature of God. The nature of man is superior to that of material things, yet it is not unlimited in its capacities. Nevertheless, man has a tendency to attempt to go beyond his own limits and deny his creaturehood in practice. This is the sin of pride, the fundamental evil of man to which all sin is reducible in one way or another. Though this tendency, this "sin" is inevitable, man remains free and responsible for his action. Original sin, considered as a personal shortcoming of a protoparent with repercussions on his entire progeny, is only a "myth," a symbol of that basic law of man's nature, the tendency to pride which leads him to attempt action beyond the limits of his being as a creature.



This second portion of the book is in many ways a most commendable attempt to establish a Christian view of the true nature of man. The reduction of man's sinfulness to pride and the attempt to escape the requirements of his own nature is essentially correct as is the repudiation of the doctrine that man is essentially evil in his nature. There is, however, a tendency to confuse the interpretation of an individual or a school with the essence of a system of thought. Worst of all, the author seems to have fallen into an error similar to that which he rightly lays at the door of modern thinkers. Just as man can never be understood unless due importance be given to both body and spirit, so human nature must ever remain a baffling mystery if man is not considered as a being both natural and supernatural. A solution which refuses to consider the supernatural character of man and his elevation to a kind of life superior to his natural life may be very logical and even plausible, but it will not be true and it will not solve the problem of human nature because it does not represent and consider man as he really is.

CHRISTIAN L. BONNET.



### STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY

S. Kierkegaard

*Translated and edited by Walter Lowrie*  
*Princeton University Press, 1941, pp. 472, \$6.00*

This work, part of which is in the form of the Platonic dialogues, is compared by its sponsors in English not only to the form of these classics but to the style and content as well. The book, however, is primarily useful for the picture it gives of the workings of the mind of Søren Kierkegaard on the subject of love and marriage, in which his personal experience was most unhappy. Despite such experience, bitterness and cynicism have no more part in the book than has vulgarity. Yet only the reader already acquainted with Kierkegaard's work in metaphysics and on the vexing problem of the relation of Christian thought to philosophy would see in this work thoughts equal in significance to those of its Platonic prototypes. A full appreciation of *Stages in Life's Way* must await a fuller knowledge of the achievements and failure of the man whose mind is here portrayed in such faint and obscure lines and shadows.

BERNARD W. DEMPSEY.



### THE WRITINGS OF ROBERT GROSSETESTE

S. Harrison Thomson

*Cambridge University Press, 1940, pp. xv + 302, \$5.00*

Out of his study of Wyclif's philosophical treatises has grown Professor Thomson's present monumental essay in mediaeval bibliography. The gratitude which the present reviewer feels can be only part of the gratitude which all scholars must feel toward him for having provided a work which will have to be the point of departure not simply for all Grosseteste study, but as well for many researches into the history of philosophy, theology, literature, and science.


It is almost impossible to review this book in the sense of giving a critical appraisal of its conclusions; at present the evidences upon which the mass of Professor Thomson's conclusions on dating of manuscripts and on authenticity of works are not available; and if they were available, it would be many years before a final judgment could be made. For example, an interesting problem for a number of manuscripts is how much can be determined of their date and so forth from their provenance. The author himself is as aware of these difficulties as any other scholar. There is surely a great weight of probability for

most of his conclusions and almost of certainty for many. It remains that Professor Thomson has increased at least tenfold our knowledge of the manuscript sources, and has provided what will remain for the most part the canon of Grosseteste.

(The forthcoming bulletin of the *Progress of Mediaeval-Renaissance Studies* will contain a section of *desiderata photostatica*. Until the promised edition of Grosseteste's hitherto unpublished works appears, scholars may be able to ask for photostats of Grosseteste manuscripts in the bulletin.)

We wish above all to remark that not only does Professor Thomson give us here literally thousands of details of information, each one of which is valuable, but that the book itself presents a picture of a realization in the thirteenth century of the project of Christian learning such as planned by St. Augustine for the *doctus christianus* and which probably nowhere else, not even in Roger Bacon, was so completely realized.

BERNARD J. MULLER-THYM.



### PHILOSOPHY FOR OUR TIMES

C. E. M. Joad

*Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., London, 1940, 7/6 net*


Mr. Joad wishes to save civilization from the plight in which it is. Some quotations from his introductory chapter will show his view of the situation: "Young men and women wander aimlessly along the road of life without knowing whither they are travelling, or why indeed they travel at all. In a word, they are without creed or code, standards or values. . . . There has grown to maturity a generation which is to all intents and purposes without religious belief . . . without beliefs in religion, without standards in morals, without convictions in politics, without values in art."

Now philosophy, says the author, offers a medicine for the sickness of the age because it is concerned with the study of value or good. In two respects Mr. Joad does a good work: he demolishes subjectivism as a philosophic position, and he gives—as far as he goes—a good presentation of finality.

But the philosophy that is offered is for the most part unsatisfactory. The book could be praised in the author's own words: "One is almost tempted to say that any meaning is better than none, any values, even false ones (are better) than the denial that values exist." But that is about all that can be said in praise.

Mr. Joad's philosophy does not deal with facts, but with values, not with what is, but with what ought to be. In his discussion of the scientist's view of the world, he presents forcefully the difficulties of the problem of sense cognition, but drops the matter there as though there were no solution for it. Again, his human race is an evolutionary one. Mr. Joad has, apparently, read all the poor authors, but very few of the good ones. He will scarcely hazard an opinion or commit himself on the basic truths. This diffidence is not prudence: apparently Mr. Joad simply does not know; he has not that complete wisdom which is the mark of a philosopher.

J. E. CANTWELL.



### THE DILEMMA OF SCIENCE

William M. Agar

*Sheed and Ward, New York, 1941, pp. xvii + 140, \$2.00*

Those who are trying to remove the four-hundred-year old misunderstanding between Religion and Science, and between Scholastic Philosophy and Science, appear now to be entering a new era of hope. At least, such is the optimis-



tic conclusion of Doctor Agar after his study of the trends of thought among leading modern scientists. Scientists, abandoning their materialistic and mechanistic explanations of ultimate causes, are groping more or less blindly for a new and more satisfying explanation of first causes. Scholastic philosophers now have an unusual opportunity to present their truths to the minds of scientists who are much more disposed to listen than they have perhaps ever been in the history of modern science.

Doctor Agar begins by recalling the philosophical and theological vagaries of men of the past who were great scientists, but who unfortunately could not be convinced that they were not, ipso facto, great theologians and philosophers. After a short discussion on the errors of scientists of the recent past, the author makes a cursory review of the critical problem and its application to scientific research, and ends with a discussion on the collapse of the materialistic and mechanistic theories of nature.

Although Doctor Agar is well acquainted with the real difficulties at issue between Philosophy and Science, and Religion and Science, there is much to be desired in his treatment of these difficulties. The book is so sketchy that it barely escapes being merely an outline of topics on the philosophical and theological problems of science which should be treated in a series of several large volumes.

The book has a pronounced apologetic tone. Though most of its substance is philosophical, the author seeks not so much to teach Philosophy as to vindicate the superiority of Scholastic Philosophy over any philosophy to which Science may ever have given birth.

The author has written for no particular group. He expresses the hope that his book will be a help to others in their search for truth. Such we hope it will be; but his rapid, cursory, and superficial treatment of a large number of topics is not likely to be a substantial help. It is to be hoped that if Doctor Agar continues to write on subjects of this nature, he will narrow the limits of his subject and treat it more exhaustively.

LAWRENCE W. FRIEDRICH.

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## BETWEEN PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Philipp Frank

Harvard University Press, 1941, pp. 238, \$2.75

One of the founders of the "Vienna Circle" of scientists gives us a clear formulation of the principles of logical empiricism or logical positivism. According to Mr. Frank: "There are no boundaries between science and philosophy, if we only formulate the task of physics in accordance with the doctrines of Ernst Mach, using the words of Carnap: 'To order the perceptions systematically and from present perceptions to draw conclusions about perceptions to be expected.'" Clearly such a position reduces philosophy to a super-physics. The laudable urge to seek unity in multiplicity has led Mr. Frank to subordinate all sciences to one method. Naturally, then, everything which does not fit this method is beyond him.

If we accepted the principle of causality as a mere succession of universe-states, we should be tempted to agree with Mr. Frank that all theoretical science is the work of the imagination. For him, the most general principles of theoretical science are purely conventional definitions depending on human arbitrariness. Such concepts as electron, atom, action quantum, form only a mental framework, useful at the present time for representing a connected system of science. Against such attacks modern science is helpless unless it accepts the aid of a sound philosophy. Because of false philosophies, scientists find themselves in an intellec-

tual swamp where every effort to free themselves only causes them to sink deeper. Many at least would like to get back to firm ground, but the supporters of logical positivism are satisfied to remain where they are and proclaim there is no solid ground.

THEODORE J. WOLF.

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## PENSEES AND THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS

Blaise Pascal

Random House, Inc., 1941, pp. xvi + 620, \$.95

Belonging to the Modern Library Series, *Pensées* is translated by W. F. Trotter, *The Provincial Letters* by Thomas M'Crie.

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## IRVING BABBITT: MAN AND TEACHER

Edited by Frederick Manchester and Odell Shepard

G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1941, pp. xii + 337, \$3.00

A biographical narrative of the great humanist formed by a combination of essays or memoirs written by acquaintances and students of Babbitt. Contributions were made by such men as Paul Elmer More, Odell Shephard, T. S. Eliot, Norman Foerster, Louis J. A. Mercier, John Livingston Lowes and twenty-three other well known men of letters and achievement.

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## THE RED HAT

Covelle Newcomb

Longmans, Green and Co., 1941, pp. viii + 278, \$2.00

A biography of John Henry Cardinal Newman in novel form, for children.

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## BOOKS RECEIVED

*Theory of Criticism in Moral Aspects According to Thomistic Principles* by Sister Mary Gonzaga Udell, Catholic U. of America, 1941. Pp. xi-126. \$2.00.

*Intellectual Virtues According to the Philosophy of St. Thomas* by Sister Mary Rose Brennan, Catholic U. of America, 1941. Pp. xii-188. \$2.00.

*Companion to the Summa, Vol. 1, Architect of the Universe* by Walter Farrell, Sheed and Ward, 1941. Pp. vii-457. \$3.50.

*Philosophy of Christian Education*, Proceedings of the Western Division of American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1941. Pp. 125. \$0.75.

*Dialectic of Morals* by Mortimer J. Adler, Review of Politics, Notre Dame U., 1941. Pp. 117. \$1.80.

*Fear and Trembling* by Søren Kierkegaard, Princeton U. Press, 1941. Pp. xiii-212. \$2.75.

*Repetition* by Søren Kierkegaard, Princeton U. Press, 1941. Pp. xlii-212. \$2.75.

*Christian Criticism of Life* by Lynn Harold Hough, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1941. Pp. 312. \$2.50.

*Sickness Unto Death* by Søren Kierkegaard, Princeton U. Press, 1941. Pp. xix-231. \$2.75.

*Plato's Earlier Dialectic* by Richard Robinson, Cornell U. Press, 1941. Pp. viii-239. \$3.00.

*Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation* by Jerome Paul Ledvina, Catholic U. of America, 1941. Pp. xiii-142. \$1.50.

*The Emancipation of a Freethinker* by Herbert Ellsworth Cory, Bruce Publishing Co., 1941. Pp. xx-313. \$3.00. (Science and Culture Series.)

*Ransoming The Time* by J. Maritain, Charles Scribners' Sons, 1941. Pp. xii-322. \$3.00.